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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the controversial international legal principle
of universal jurisdiction-i.e., the principle that criminal jurisdiction
* Associate, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP, New York. I would like to thank and
dedicate this Article to my father for his invaluable administrative assistance during the submis-
sion process.
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by all states arises solely from the nature of the crime committed. The
Article deals with two main issues confronting the modern doctrine
and application of the principle: (i) whether a state may assert universal
jurisdiction absent the presence of the accused on that state's territory,
and (ii) what crimes give rise to universal jurisdiction. The purpose of
this Article is to explore these issues fully, taking into consideration
both theoretical and practical concerns, and to resolve the issues in
favor of a modern principle of universal jurisdiction tailored to the
oftentimes competing needs of international justice and peaceful
relations among states.
A. Universal Jurisdiction in International Law
The term 'jurisdiction" is a legal proxy for the power to apply and
enforce laws over a defined group of persons. The persons may be
defined by their physical presence in a given territory or by a legal
relationship to that territory (for example, the relationship of citizen-
ship or nationality). One of the most general forms of jurisdiction is
that of a nation state over its own territory,' which is called by such
diverse names as "national jurisdiction," "state jurisdiction," "domestic
jurisdiction," or just "sovereignty." One jurisdiction may overlap with
anotherjurisdiction; in such cases there is concurrentjurisdiction. 2 Of
intense interest in recent international relations and academic debate
is the legal question of when a state can assert its criminal jurisdiction
over conduct that occurs outside its own borders.3
Jurisdiction in international law is seldom clear because its "interna-
tional" dimension contemplates various and fluid factors, not the least
of which is the potential impact of a given jurisdictional assertion on
other states with concurrent jurisdictional claim over the accused
1. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of UniversalJurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 40
(Stephen Macedo, ed., U. Penn. Press 2004); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits:
UniversalJurisdiction and National Courts, in UNIVERSALJURISDICTION, supra, at 171-72.
2. Consider two states, A and B, each having jurisdiction over its own territory. Can state A
extend its jurisdiction to all or part of state B's territory? When it can, the jurisdiction is called
"concurrent." Examples of concurrentjurisdiction might bejurisdiction over a vessel of A docked
in B's territorial waters, orA's embassy building located in B's capital city. It is also possible forA to
extend itsjurisdiction over its nationals who are visiting B or doing business in B; those, too, would
be examples of concurrentjurisdiction. But, tinder existing international law at least, and for the
foreseeable future, A cannot extend itsjurisdiction to a boundary dispute between two counties in
B. Such a dispute falls clearly within B's exclusive jurisdiction.
3. Seegenerally Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 40; Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSALJURISDICTION (2003).
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offender.4 There are a number of established bases or principles in
customary law that describe jurisdiction.5 The territoriality principle is
invoked when the act over which a state wishes to assert jurisdiction
takes place or has an effect on the territory of that state. 6 The so-called
"flag principle" may be considered an extension of the territoriality
principle because it holds that vessels carrying a state's flag are subject
to that state's jurisdiction,7 or put differently, the vessel is that state's
territory. The nationality or active personality principle is invoked
where the perpetrator of the offense is a national of the state, and the
passive personality principle is invoked when the victim of the offense is
a national of the state.8 The protective principle is invoked where the
offense "harms the state's interests."9 The representation principle is
applied where a custodial state-the state on whose territory the
offender is found-prosecutes an offense by acting as a surrogate for
the territorial state. Under the representation principle the crime need
not be proscribed as a matter of international law, and some form of
understanding or cooperation between the territorial and prosecuting
state is necessary. 1°
Finally, the most controversial principle ofjurisdiction is the univer-
sality principle." This principle holds that international law considers
certain acts to be so egregious that the nature of the crime itself
engendersjurisdiction by any state irrespective of territorial or national
links. 12 Serious crimes under international law that are potentially
subject to universal jurisdiction' 3 include genocide, slavery, torture,
4. See HenryJ. Steiner, Three Cheers for UniversalJurisdiction-or Is It Only Two? 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 199, 224-25 (2004) (describing reaction from other states against the potential
exercise of expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction by Belgian courts under Belgium's Law of 1993,
amended in 1999, which allowed for the prosecution of foreigners for international crimes
irrespective of where the crime occurred).
5. See REsDAMs, supra note 3, at 21 (describing the bases and the recent commentary on
international extraterritorial jurisdiction generally).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 22; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 402 cmt. h, 502(2) (1987).
8. See REYDAMS, supra note 3, at 21.
9. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 n.24 (2d Cir. 2003).
10. For a full explanation of this principle, see REYDAMS, supra note 3, at 24, 32-35.
11. See generally Steiner, supra note 4.
12. See THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNVERSALJURISDICTION 23, 28-29 (Stephen Macedo ed.,
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crimes against humanity, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism. 14 The
focus of this Article is on universal crimes and the nature of the
jurisdiction they engender. 15
B. Two Main Issues Confronting Universal Jurisdiction
The controversy surrounding the universality principle stems from
two main issues raised in modern theory and practice, both of which
are fundamentally jurisdictional. The first issue focuses on the state
asserting jurisdiction and asks whether that state may do so absent the
presence of the accused on its territory-or what this Article will call
"universal jurisdiction in absentia." The second issue focuses on the
alleged universal criminal's jurisdiction-triggering conduct and asks
what crimes give rise to universal jurisdiction.
In response to the first issue, Part II of this Article will take the
position that states may assert universal jurisdiction in absentia-a
position that has met with grave skepticism by courts and commenta-
tors alike.1 6 This Part will first briefly define universal jurisdiction in
absentia and distinguish it from issues associated with trials in absentia.
It will then confront the difficulties inherent in universal jurisdiction in
absentia-most particularly, the potential for serious clashes among
states with concurrent jurisdiction and the resulting threats to sover-
eignty that in absentia assertions pose. The discussion will observe that
much of the difficulty a traditional sovereignty analysis has with univer-
saljurisdiction is based on a formalistic understanding ofjurisdictional
14. See id. princ. 2(1), at 29 (Serious Crimes Under International Law); see also OsCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 268 (1991).
15. The advantages of the universality principle over the other two principles that potentially
allow for states to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreigners for offenses committed abroad
against non-nationals-the protective principle and the representation principle-deserve brief
mention. The problem with the protective principle is obvious; the subjectivity inherent in
determinations by self-interested states as to what "harms their interests" combined with the lack
of external objective criteria leads to an infinitely expansive jurisdictional base covering virtually
any conduct whatsoever. On the other hand, the representation principle proves too restrictive
because it requires some form of consent or understanding between the territorial and prosecut-
ing state absent which a prosecution would not be viable no matter how egregious the offense. In
this sense, the representation principle appears to work in somewhat the same manner as the
principle of extradition, discussed infra Part ILA, in that both deem the prosecution a result of
comity between states instead of a matter of customary right.
16. See generally Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v.
Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (separate opinions of President Guillaume, Judge Rezek),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm; REYDAMs, supra note
3, at 224, 230.
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interplay among states whereby jurisdiction derives from an exclusive
list of well-defined interests, most prominently, territorial and national.
These interests measure the objective link that a given state has to an
offense and provide forjurisdiction accordingly.
Of course, the problem with universal jurisdiction is that the objec-
tive link-the offense itself-theoretically exists for all states (that is,
jurisdiction stems from all states having an interest in bringing univer-
sal criminals to justice). Thus, in order to cabin in the potentially
arbitrary and sovereignty-destructive reach of this form of jurisdiction,
some other objective criterion must be added. Although arguably
unique to and theoretically inconsistent with universal jurisdiction, the
requirement that the accused be present on the state's territory serves
this function. While the presence criterion is external to the universal
principle itself, it serves as a practical check on the ability of states to
dilute and disrespect other states' sovereignty through in absentia
assertions.
Accordingly, in resolving the threat that universal jurisdiction poses
to sovereignty, Part II will identify a procedure whereby states practice
universal jurisdiction in a way that respects sovereignty by balancing
well-defined, established interests. The procedure uses established
jurisdictional bases to describe a burgeoning custom underlying the
increased-albeit still limited-practice of universal jurisdiction. The
procedural model distributes jurisdictional competences according to
a hierarchy of these established bases or interests: territoriality, nation-
ality (active personality), passive personality, the extent to which the
offense harms the state's interests, etc. The distribution of jurisdic-
tional priority determines which state has a stronger jurisdictional
claim over the offense and the accused. Those states having the
strongest link to the offense and the accused will always have superior
jurisdictional priority. However, absent their willingness to assertjuris-
diction, the accused will not enjoy an effective grant of impunity
because some other state may always step up to close the jurisdictional
loophole. In this respect, an assertion of universal jurisdiction in
absentia will act as a last resort option since any state on whose territory
the accused is found-i.e., the custodial state-will have priority over
another state which, absent traditional jurisdictional links, is looking to
assert universal jurisdiction. Through this procedure, traditional juris-
dictional bases, each rooted in self-contained notions of sovereignty (in
that jurisdiction stems from the strength of a state's autonomous
interest in prosecuting the harm), work together in a sovereignty-
respectful way to protect not only a state's autonomous interest, but the
larger international interest as well.
2005]
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Part II will explain further how universal jurisdiction in absentia
actually strengthens interstate relations because it provides for signal-
ing among states. It will argue that such signaling develops and clarifies
custom in a way that affords states more options to act against perpetra-
tors of international crime. In this regard, it will show how in absentia
assertions provide a means of communication among states whereby
universal jurisdictional claims may be evaluated prospectively and
reacted to by interested states, invariably adding to and refining the
currently vague rule of universal jurisdiction and freeing states to act
pursuant to a surer custom. Moreover, it will describe how this new
form of universal jurisdiction through signaling is more respectful of
sovereignty than the usual exercise of universal jurisdiction (where the
accused is found on the state's territory), and even tends to focus
international relations on human rights.
Last, Part II will demonstrate how universal jurisdiction in absentia
combats impunity by providing a measure of punishment and deter-
rence of serious international crime where the alternatives in interna-
tional legal practice are judicial paralysis on the one hand and more
intrusive and belligerent self-help measures, like abducting the accused
or taking military action against the harboring state, on the other. Part
II will conclude that universal jurisdiction in absentia may be asserted
in a way that offers a moderate and flexible approach to international
crime capable of accommodating the potentially conflicting interests
of sovereignty maximization and international justice.
In response to the second issue-what crimes give rise to universal
jurisdiction-Part III will explore the category of crimes conventionally
considered to be universal in nature. In so doing, it will explain how the
category of crimes susceptible to universal jurisdiction has undergone
radical transformation since the end of World War II and now poten-
tially includes genocide, slavery, torture, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and perhaps terrorism. 17 The discussion will canvass the ration-
ales behind the inclusion of genocide, slavery, and torture under the
universaljurisdiction rubric. It will then discuss serious problems raised
by the use in practice of war crimes and crimes against humanity as
bases of universal jurisdiction. Specifically, it will examine why, while
these crimes may conventionally be considered universal in nature,
aspects of their definition and scope lead too easily to abuse of
universal jurisdiction for purely political or sensationalist motives and,
17. SeeTHE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSA[-JURISDICTION, supra note 12, princ. 2(1), at 29
(Serious Crimes Under International Law); see also SCHACHTER, supra note 14, at 268.
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consequently, why use of these crimes as jurisdictional bases invokes
powerful opposition by interested states. The discussion will contend
that, in the end, universal jurisdictional assertions over these crimes at
the present time might work only to undermine customary develop-
ment of the principle. Finally, Part III will argue that while "terrorism"
generally defined is not subject to universal jurisdiction, certain well-
defined acts of terrorism-like planting a bomb on civilian aircraft-
are. These acts have clearly spelled-out meanings in positive interna-
tional law instruments like treaties and conventions, instruments that
moreover provide for extraterritorial and extra-national jurisdiction to
reflect the underlying customary law as to the universal nature of the
crimes.
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN ABSENTIA
A. Defining Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia
In absentia assertions over crimes of universal jurisdiction contem-
plate jurisdiction over defendants who are either in hiding or openly
living in harboring countries. This basis of criminal jurisdiction argues
for an extension of territorial jurisdiction to encompass the globe with
respect to certain crimes because the crimes themselves jeopardize the
globe. In contrast, if an individual is physically on the territory or
before the court with the appropriate jurisdiction in, say, a routine war
crimes case conducted in an international tribunal or municipal court,
much of the following discussion becomes irrelevant. In other words,
the discussion is critical to cases where serious international criminals
evade more routine forms of criminal jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction in absentia can be roughly defined as the
conducting of an investigation, the issuing of an arrest warrant, and/or
the bringing of criminal charges based on the principle of universal
jurisdiction when the defendant is not present in the territory of the
acting state.18 This definition does not include adjudication of the case.
Ajoint separate opinion in the International Court ofJustice (ICJ), for
example, has explicitly distinguished between universal jurisdiction in
absentia and trials in absentia, observing that
18. Cf Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Beig.),
2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal)
11 57, 59, available at http://vvw.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_
ijudgment_20020214_higgins-kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF.
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[s] ome jurisdictions provide for trial in absentia; others do not.
If it is said that a person must be within the jurisdiction at the
time of the trial itself, that may be a prudent guarantee for the
right of fair trial but has little to do with bases of jurisdiction
under international law.19
Thus, for purposes of defining universal jurisdiction in absentia, it is
the nature of in absentia jurisdiction-i.e., universal jurisdiction in
absentia-not the nature of an in absentia trial that most implicates
international law. The latter question is largely considered one of
general principles of international law, 20 and any positive obligation
19. See id. 1 56. It follows that issues of due process in a trial in absentia conducted pursuant
to universal jurisdiction in absentia do not impact the legal validity of the jurisdiction and vice
versa. The Princeton Principles, a progressive academic restatement on the subject of universal
jurisdiction, takes a similar approach to universal jurisdiction in absentia. ThePrinciples specifically
allow for the possibility of universal jurisdiction in absentia as envisaged by the joint separate
opinion. The official commentary accompanying The Principles states that
subsection (2) of Principle 1 holds that a "competent and ordinary"judicial body may
try accused persons on the basis of universaljurisdiction "provided the person is present
before suchjudicial body." The language of Principle 1 (2) does not prevent a state from
initiating the criminal process, conducting an investigation, issuing an indictment, or
requesting extradition, when the accused is not present.
THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 12, at 45 (official commentary).
Indeed, due process is a constant consideration under international law quite apart from, and
irrespective of, the jurisdiction being asserted. See International Convent on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14,999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 [hereinafter ICCPR].
20. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical
Framework, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: CRIMES 109 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(explaining that "[t]he rules of procedure and evidence which have been developed by the
[international tribunals] are based on general principles of procedural law which emerge from
the laws and practices of the world's major criminal justice systems"); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human
Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent
Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DuKEJ. COMa'. & INT'L L. 235, 239-40 (1993) (observing in a
review of international criminal procedural rights that his "study uses a purely empirical model of
searching for repetition and similarity among the various rights to prove that similar rights
evidence the existence of principles common to international law and national law, and that they
are binding 'general principles of law'"); see also SCHACHTER, supra note 14, at 51 ("The use of
municipal law rules for international judicial and arbitral procedure has been more common and
more specific than any other type of application."); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES
AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 210 (1927) ("It is in their capacity as courts ofjustice that
international tribunals have taken over and adapted for their purposes private law rules of
evidence and procedure."). For specific examples, see Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by
the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 51-53 (Jan. 14) (citing resjudicata as
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such principles pose among states, for example via international treaty
or covenant, enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.21
As to the issue of in absentia jurisdiction, in absentia territorial or
national jurisdiction is relatively uncontroversial. Indeed, these types of
in absentia jurisdictional assertions can lead to the most routine
requests for extradition, or "the right for a State on the territory of
which an accused or convicted person has taken refuge, to deliver him
up to another State which has requisitioned his return and is compe-
tent to judge and punish him."22 Further, if a request for extradition is
denied or simply not pursued, a territorial or national state may
proceed with a trial in absentia under the prosecuting state's municipal
law. For instance, France's in absentia trial and conviction of Argentine
Captain Alfredo Astiz in 1990 for the kidnapping and disappearance of
two French nuns in Argentina 23 was based on an accepted passive
"well-established and generally recognized principle of law"); Corfu Channel (U.K v. Alb.), 1949
I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9) (noting that inference drawn from "indirect evidence is admitted in all systems
of law, and [that] its use is recognized by international decisions") ;Judgments of the Administra-
tive Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation upon Complaints Made Against the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 85-86 (Oct. 23)
(discussing equality of parties before the court as a generally accepted practice of municipal law).
In an oft-quoted passage from his opinion in the 1950 Advisory Opinion on the International
Status of South West Africa, Lord McNair explained:
International law has recruited and continues to recruit many of its rules and institu-
tions from private systems of law .... The way in which international law borrows from
this source is not by means of importing private law institutions "lock, stock and barrel",
[sic] ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules .... In my opinion the true view
of the duty of international tribunals in this matter is to regard any features or
terminology which are reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an
indication of policy and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and
institutions.
1950 I.C.J 129, 148 (July 11) (separate opinion of Sir Arnold McNair).
21. The margin of appreciation is a doctrine first developed by the European Court of
Human Rights that "grants varying degrees of deference to the national authorities' evaluation of
how [an internationally agreed-upon] right applies in particular circumstances." Gerald L.
Neuman, The United States Constitution and International Law: The Uses of International Law in
Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM.J. INT'L. L. 82, 87 n.29 (2004). With respect to a trial in absentia
the right would be the right to a fair trial or perhaps the right to be present at trial, see ICCPR,
supranote 19, art. 14, at 177.
22. Christopher L. Blakesly, The Law of International Extradition: A Comparative Study, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 381 (John Duggard & Christine van der Wyngaert
eds., 1996) (quoting F. DE CARDAILLAC, DE L'EXTRADITION 2-4 (1875)).
23. Public Prosecutor v. Astiz, Cour d' assises of Paris, 16 Mar. 1990, discussed in REYDAMS,
supra note 3, at 131-32.
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nationality principle, and thus France's decision to proceed with a trial
in absentia was a question for its municipal code 24 rather than interna-
tional custom. The same was true of Italy's in absentia prosecution of
the terrorist Abu Abbas, the hijacker of the Italian cruise liner the
Achille Lauro,25 which could be justified under the territoriality or flag
principles.26
While there is little question that in absentiajurisdictional assertions
based on territoriality or nationality are permissible under interna-
tional custom, for the reasons discussed below, in absentia jurisdic-
tional claims based solely on the principle of universality have created
much controversy. 27 Thus, this Section addresses situations where a
state asserts in absentia jurisdiction over a universal crime absent
territorial or national links, i.e., universal jurisdiction in absentia.
Perhaps the most famous example of a universal jurisdiction in
absentia claim is Belgium's issuance of an international arrest warrant
for Yerodia Ndombasi, Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs,28 for war
crimes and crimes against humanity, including genocide. 29 Belgium
issued the arrest warrant although Belgium had no national link to
Ndombasi, no territorial or national link to the alleged crimes he had
24. Richard Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14, 83
(John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996).
25. See David Ensor, U.S. Captures Mastermind of Achille Lauro Hijacking, CNN.com, Apr. 16,
2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/15/spj.irq.abbas.arrested.
26. See discussion supra Part I.A.
27. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. BeIg.), 2002
I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/
icobe-ijudgment_20020214.PDF.
28. Ndombasi was, at the time the arrest warrant was issued, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
However, his position changed subsequent to the arrest warrant issuance. SeePress Statement ofJudge
Gilbert Guillaume, President ofthe International Court ofJustice (Feb. 14, 2002), athttp://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeech PresidentGuillaume cobe % 20j udgement 20020214.
htm. See also Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) 13, 18, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/
icobejudgment'icobe ijudgment 20020214.PDF. The International Court ofJustice decided the
case on the issue of Ndomasi's immunity as Minister of Foreign Affairs and found that because of
his immunity, the arrest warrant violated international law. The question concerning the validity
of the warrant in absentia, apart from the immunity issue, did not directly contribute to the court's
decision. See id. 78(2).
29. For a specific account of the charges, see Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000,
2002 I.C.J. 121 (joint separate opinion ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 1 64 ("The
arrest warrant issued against Mr. Yerodia accuses him both of war crimes and of crimes against
humanity. As regards the latter, charges of incitement to racial hatred, which are said to have led
to murders and lynchings, were specified.... [There is precedent] that liability for a crime against
humanity includes liability through incitement to commit the crime concerned.").
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committed, and no evidence of Ndombasi's presence on Belgian
territory. 30 Because Belgium issued the warrant absent any territorial or
national link, Belgium's jurisdiction over Ndombasi could only be
justified under the principle of universal jurisdiction. 3' And because
the warrant was issued absent the presence of the accused on Belgian
territory, it can be categorized only as an assertion of universal jurisdic-
tion in absentia.
Congo brought the case to the ICJ, which issued itsjudgment in Case
Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium) on February 14, 2002.32 In the ICJ majority's opinion, the
case turned on the issue of diplomatic immunity rather than jurisdic-
tional questions, as Ndombasi was, at the time of the warrant's issuance,
the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs and was therefore immune
from criminal jurisdiction under international law.33 After the ICJ's
ruling against Belgium, Belgium repealed the arrest warrant and, in an
interesting twist, its pre-trial Court of Appeals chamber ruled that the
proceedings against Ndombasi were not valid from the start, as Ndom-
basi had not been voluntarily present in Belgium.
34
Nonetheless, the Belgian arrest warrant set the stage for discussion of
whether universal jurisdiction in absentia is, and should be, permissible
as a matter of customary international law. Some of the judges took up
the question in separate opinions. Judge Guillaume and Judge Rezek
rejected the idea of universal jurisdiction in absentia chiefly on the
rationale that such a doctrine would lead to arbitrary assertions by
more powerful states against nationals of weaker states and erode
international cooperation. 5 judge Koroma supported the assertion of
universal jurisdiction in absentia without much explanation. 36 Examin-
ing the issue in detail, the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal broke new ground in observing that
30. See id. 91 2.
31. Cf id. 9919-20.
32. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121.
33. Id. 91 54, 71.
34. SeeREYDAMS, supra note 3, at 116.
35. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.CJ. 121 (separate opinion of
President Guillaume) 15, (separate opinion ofJudge Rezek) 9.
36. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (separate opinion of
Judge Koroma), 8 ("Belgium is entitled to invoke its criminal jurisdiction against anyone, save a
Foreign Minister in office. It is unfortunate that the wrong case would appear to have been chosen
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universal jurisdiction may be exercised in absentia.
The joint separate opinion found that although customary interna-
tional law did not yet promote a rule of universal jurisdiction in
absentia, neither did it preclude such jurisdictional assertions. The
opinion also proposed certain safeguards for the implementation of
this type of universal jurisdiction 39 necessary to "prevent abuse and to
ensure that the rejection of impunity does not jeopardize stable rela-
tions between States."40 The joint separate opinion made clear that
while the universality principle is relatively straightforward in its argu-
ment that states may assert universal jurisdiction,41 more confusion
surrounds the questions of how and when this jurisdiction may be
asserted-that is, under what conditions can universal jurisdiction be
exercised in absentia?42 To be sure, even some of the most progressive
academic commentary on the issue has not taken a firm stand one way
or the other on this issue.43 This Article argues that the accused need
not be present on the territory of the state when universal jurisdiction is
asserted provided that certain safeguards against abuse are followed.
B. The Threat to Sovereignty
Universal jurisdiction in absentia is presently caught in a customary
twilight that will witness either the development or the dismissal of the
practice depending on the actions and reactions of states in the next
part of this century. State practice has not yet worn into the fabric of
37. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (joint separate opinion
ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 59.
38. Id. 45.
39. According to the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Burgenthal,
the safeguards would relate specifically to universaljurisdiction in absentia as opposed to universal
jurisdiction where the alleged criminal is in the territory of the state that is assertingjurisdiction.
Id. 59.
40. Id.
41. Id. 58-59; see also SCHACTrER, supra note 14, at 268-69.
42. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of l1 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (joint separate opinion
ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 54.
43. See, e.g., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSALJURISDICrION, supra note 12, at 43:
Should the Principles insist at least that the accused is physically present in the territory
of the enforcing state? Should other connecting links also be required? Participants
decided not to include an explicit requirement of a territorial link in Principle 1 (1)'s
definition. This was done partly to allow for further discussion, partly to avoid stifling
the evolution of universal jurisdiction, and partly out of deference to pending litigation
in the International Court ofJustice.
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international law an affirmative custom of universal jurisdiction in
absentia assertions.? At the same time, however, an incipient trend
supporting this type of assertion is emerging, and those who take a
permissive view of international law might legitimately submit that
custom does not explicitly prohibit universal jurisdiction in absentia.45
The most obvious objection to universal jurisdiction in absentia is
that its use is hostile to basic principles of state sovereignty. The
sovereignty argument holds that such jurisdiction undermines state
sovereignty in both an abstract and a concrete manner. In the abstract,
the universal jurisdiction in absentia claim disposes of the classical
notion of jurisdiction as being rooted in state sovereignty; that is, the
practice tends to dilute or negate the jurisdictional prerogative granted
to the sovereign state by international law. Reydams explains:
To be sure, in absentia proceedings in [universal jurisdiction]
cases do not interfere with the domestic affairs of other States
since the alleged crimes are indeed crimes under international
law. Nevertheless, the fact is that jurisdiction exercised by a
State without its having an objective or legal link with either the
offence or the offender erodes the very concept ofjurisdiction.
Unlimited (hence arbitrary) jurisdiction is a contradictio in
terminis and runs counter to one of the fundamental goals of
international law: a rational distribution of competences among
equal sovereigns. Thus, while not violating the non-interfer-
ence principle, universal jurisdiction in absentia contravenes the
more fundamental principle of sovereign equality of States, of
which non-interference is only one aspect.
46
But this criticism is even too generous because it ignores the con-
crete face of the sovereignty argument: the possibility that in absentia
proceedings could be abused by national courts for their own political
ends, thereby creating very real interference in the domestic affairs of
states protecting the accused. In this regard, the practice of universal
jurisdiction plays an active role in deconstructing state sovereignty, not
44. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (separate opinion of
President Guillaume) 16; REYDAms, supra note 3, at 224.
45. See, e.g., Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 1I April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (joint
separate opinion ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 44-52. But see RE"DAMS, supra
note 3, at 230 (disagreeing with points made by the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Burgenthal).
46. REYDAMS, supra note 3, at 224.
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only by diluting the state's jurisdictional prerogative, but also by using
the expansive jurisdictional claim to attack that state's decision not to
prosecute and even to protect the accused. Mutual respect for sover-
eignty and the desire to maintain interstate relations through non-
interference with other (harboring, and perhaps territorial and na-
tional) states will therefore tend to block the operation of universal
jurisdictional assertions and proceedings. As a result, in absentiajuris-
diction over universal crimes is viewed with a great deal of skepticism or
flat rejection by those who seek to maximize state sovereignty at the
expense of international justice. As will be discussed in Part III, the
interest of sovereignty maximization provides an excellent reason for
limiting the category of universal crimes to those which are most clearly
defined under international law; opening the floodgates of in absentia
prosecutions to an expansive list of crimes would ensure that these
proceedings are never born as a matter of practice.47
The argument that universal jurisdiction in absentia threatens sover-
eignty is premised on the notion that because universal jurisdiction has
no objective criteria limiting its seemingly random application (other
than the presence of the accused), in absentia assertions would create a
chaotic and arbitrary method of enforcing international law. 48 This
speculation does not, however, accurately reflect how universaljurisdic-
tion actually works. The practice of universal jurisdiction by states,
including those limited instances of universal jurisdiction in absentia,
points not to randomness, but rather to a somewhat balanced approach
that contemplates the competition of traditional (and sometimes non-
traditional) state interests. While the burgeoning custom of universal
jurisdictional assertions in general may not have established a clear rule
promoting the use of universal jurisdiction in absentia, 49 it has sug-
gested a customary procedure among states wishing to assert jurisdic-
tion over universal crimes. The procedure protects individual state
sovereignty, encourages coordination among states in bringing interna-
tional criminals tojustice, and presents the in absentia assertion only as
a last resort option.
47. See discussion infta Part III.D.
48. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of I1 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (separate opinion of
President Guillaume) 15; RErDAMS, supra note 3, at 224.
49. See Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (separate opinion of
President Guillaume) 1 15, (separate opinion of Judge Rezek) 6, (joint separate opinion of
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 1 45.
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C. Identifying a Practice ofJurisdictional Assertions Among States
Instead of viewing universal jurisdiction as an exceptional jurisdic-
tional base that steps in only when more prevalent bases like territorial-
ity or nationality have failed to produce results, universality can be
understood as the governingjurisdictional base for all situations involv-
ing the limited class of crime. Taking this view, crimes of universal
jurisdiction are most often dealt with on the basis of territorial or
national interest.5 ° State practice in this regard does not erode the
grave or "universal" nature of the crime itself-indeed, it shows that
territorial or national states often take the prosecutions of these types
of crimes very seriously. And importantly, nor do territorial or national
state prosecutions erode the universal nature of the jurisdiction. If a
consensus of states' positive law, either through treaties or municipal
legislation or both, allows forjurisdiction over a crime absent territorial
or national links, that crime is subject to universal jurisdiction.5 t While
judicial action enforcing such expansive jurisdictional provisions may
be icing on the customary cake, lack thereof resulting from a territorial
or national state taking up the gauntlet based on its direct interest in
the matter does not undermine the applicability or legitimacy of the
jurisdiction of other, non-prosecuting states. 52 It merely means that a
state with a stronger interest got there first. This last statement is, in
essence, the crux of a revised jurisdictional panorama from which a
procedure emerges for pursuing universal jurisdiction in absentia.
That procedure holds that whichever state has the stronger interest in
prosecuting the crime-as measured by traditional jurisdictional sover-
eignty interests-has superiorjurisdictional priority in prosecuting the
crime. Any state with inferiorjurisdictional priority may only prosecute
if those states with superior claim have declined. At the bottom of this
distribution of jurisdictional competence is the state that has no
50. For instance, prosecutions for ethnic cleansing conducted in the former Yugoslavian or
Rwandan municipal legal systems, or prosecutions for certain terrorist acts by states on whose
territory or against whose nationals the acts were perpetrated, represent a large number of
prosecutions of universal crimes.
51. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 48 (noting that "[plositive international law in the
twentieth century has clearly established universal jurisdiction for piracy" through expansive
jurisdictional provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the High Seas and the 1982
Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea even though there appear not to be instances of
courts trying actual pirates). To be sure, the presence of universal jurisdiction in customary law
may really only be justified by interpreting these forms of state action as evidence of state practice
since there has not been a consensus of states practicing universal jurisdiction in their courts.
52. See id.
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territorial link to the crime, no national link to the crime, and no
custody over the accused to boot.
A review of assertions of universal jurisdiction by non-territorial,
non-national courts5 3 reveals that states do not act arbitrarily in assert-
ing universal jurisdiction but instead typically have some sort of other
objective interest in prosecution or some link to the accused or the
crime-for example, victims of the crime now living in the state may be
petitioning the state for a prosecution.54 Even more importantly, there
is usually a good reason why the prosecution falls to the state asserting
universal jurisdiction-namely, the territorial or national state is un-
able or unwilling to prosecute. It is in this circumstance that an
assertion of universal jurisdiction by non-territorial and non-national
states is most appropriate. Similarly, only if the territorial, national, and
custodial state(s) refuse to prosecute will universal jurisdiction in
absentia be suitable. By looking at how states behave with respect to
universal jurisdiction in general, we may identify an underlying custom
for distributing jurisdictional competences while respecting sover-
eignty and apply this custom in the context of universal jurisdiction in
absentia.
It is almost inevitable that those cases of universal jurisdiction that
produce the most interstate conflict in the form of claimed sovereignty
infringements receive the most attention. 55 However, many cases pro-
ceed under the radar on grounds of universal jurisdiction where
territorial and national states have failed to voice objections or have
affirmatively acquiesced in the jurisdiction of a third state. This may,
occur for a number of reasons; for instance, the territorial or national
state may be unable to prosecute because it is in a state of war or
internal turmoil, or the state may simply have no interest in prosecut-
ing.
Cases in municipal courts concerning serious human rights abuses in
53. Many of the cases discussed in the following pages are outlined and translated into
English in Luc Reydanis' extremely comprehensive and helpful work, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION,
supra note 3.
54. See, e.g., Richard Bourdeaux, Dirty War' Suspect Is Flown to Spain; Mexico Hands Over the
Alleged Argentine Executioner for Hearing in Madrid Today, L.A. TIMEsJune 29, 2003, at A4.
55. For example, the Belgian arrest warrant against Ndombasi and the various states'
interests in bringing former Chilean dictator Pinochet to trial have been reported in numerous
newspaper articles and have sparked much academic commentary. Even potential universal
jurisdictional claims have garnered media attention. See, e.g., Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes
Law Undone by Its Global Reach; Cases Against Political Figures Sparked Crises, WASH. POST, Sept. 30,
2003, at Al (describing the "diplomatic crises" caused by the filing of cases in Belgian courts
against Ariel Sharon, Fidel Castro, and George H.W. Bush among others).
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the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda during or immediately after the
respective conflicts provide good examples of universal jurisdiction at
work where territorial and national courts are unable to perform
because of internal instability. In Public Prosecutor v. Cvjetkovic, Austria
asserted universal jurisdiction over the defendant for genocide and
complicity in genocide, among other crimes, during the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia.56 After arresting the defendant, Austria notified
Bosnia, which took no action due to its then-ongoing internal con-
flict.57 The Austrian Supreme Court explained that because there was
no functioning criminaIjustice system in Bosnia-the territorial state-
Austria was competent to try the defendant under the Genocide
Convention even though the convention locatesjurisdiction only in the
territorial state or in an international criminal body.58 In another case
involving ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, Danish authorities
prosecuted and convicted a defendant where the territorial state was
incapable of cooperating or handling the prosecution because of the
continuing conflict and where the relevant international tribunal, the
ICTY, had declined to take over the proceedings. 59 The Netherlands
60
and Spain 61 have also, through their courts, indicated a willingness to
prosecute universal criminals from the former Yugoslavia.
The most prolific state with regard to universal jurisdiction prosecu-
tions based on events in the former Yugoslavia has been Germany. In
Public Prosecutor v. Tadic,6 2 German authorities arrested the defendant
on charges of aiding and abetting genocide and handed him over to
the ICTY. 63 In two other cases, however-Public Prosecutor v. Djajic and
Public Prosecutor v. Jorgic-both the ICTY and Bosnia-the territorial
56. REmDAMs, supra note 3, at 99 (citing Landesgericht Salzburg, 31 May 1995 (trial judg-
ment); Oberste Gerichtshof, 13July 1994 (appeals judgment)).
57. Id.
58. Id. Also, the international criminal body that could have taken up the case against
Cvjetkovic, the ICTY, did not do so.
59. RaDAms, supra note 3, at 128 (summarizing English Public Prosecutor v. Saric, Ostre
Landsret, Nov. 25, 1994 (trial judgment), Hojesteret, Aug. 15, 1995 (appeals judgment), reprinted
in Ugeskrift for Retsvaen 1995, 838H, translated in 1 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 431 (1998)).
60. Id. at 171-72 (summarizing Public Prosecutor v. Knesevic, Examining magistrate, Dec. 1,
1995; Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, Nov. 11, 1997, published in XCI Militair Rechterlijk Tijdschrift
198-221 (1998), translated in 1 Y.B. INT'L HUMANrARIAN L. 601 (1998)).
61. Id. at 188 (summarizing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, (IT 95-17/1-T) Dec. 10, 1998, 53,
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999)).
62. Id. at 149-50 (summarizing Public Prosecutor v. Tadic, BGH (examining magistrate),
Feb. 13, 1994, reprinted in part in Neue Zeitschrift ffir Strafrecht 232 (1994) (F.R.G.)).
63. Id. at 150.
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state-declined to take over the proceedings, and German courts
obtained convictions.6 4 In Djajic, the Bavarian Supreme Court noted
that "since the ICTY and the competent territorial State do not wish to
take over the proceedings, Germany has an interest not to be perceived
by the international community as a haven for international crimi-
nals. ''65 And the Federal Supreme Court in Jorgic explained that be-
cause the ICTY already had its hands full, "the repression of the many
crimes committed in execution of the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' urges
itself upon national courts."6 6
Although the cases mentioned thus far required a link to the
accused, such as his presence on German territory, 67 a more recent
decision of the Federal Supreme Court signaled that such a link is
unnecessary. In Public Prosecutor v. Sokolovic, the Federal Supreme Court
noted the defendant's links to Germany, consisting of his living and
working in Germany for a period of time and returning regularly to
collect payments from the Employment Office, but found that "such
additional legitimizing links are not necessary." 68 The court answered
the standard sovereignty concerns of non-interference as follows: "In-
deed, when Germany, in executing an internationally legally binding
obligation-based on an international convention [the Fourth Geneva
Convention in this case]-prosecutes an extraterritorial offence by a
foreigner against a foreigner and punishes according to German law, a
violation of the non-interference principle can scarcely be alleged. 69
This decision is in conformity with the revolutionary, and perhaps
prescient, German law entered into force in June of 2002, The Code of
Crimes Against International Law.70 The Code makes core Interna-
tional Criminal Court crimes subject to universal jurisdiction. Further-
64. Id. at 151-52 (summarizing Public Prosecutor v.Jorgic, Oberstes Landesgerict Dfsseldorf,
Sept. 26, 1997; BGH, Apr. 30, 1999, reprinted in part in Neue Zeitschrift ffir Strafrecht 396 (1999)).
65. Id. at 151 (summarizing Public Prosecutor v. Djajic, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht,
May 23, 1997, reprinted in part in NeueJuristische Wochenschrift 392 (1998); Safferling, C., case
note, 92 AM.J. INT'L L. 528 (1998)).
66. Id. at 153 (discussing Public Prosecutor v.Jorgic, Oberstes Landesgerict Dusseldorf, Sept.
26, 1997; BGH, Apr. 30, 1999).
67. See, e.g., id. at 155 (summarizing Public Prosecutor v. Sokolovic, Oberstes Landesgericht




70. Id. at 144 n.24.
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more, it explicitly authorizes universal jurisdiction in absentia. 7' The
Code's commentary explains:
Because of their particular impact, prosecution of extraterrito-
rial offences, even those committed by foreigners, does not
constitute an illegitimate interference with the sovereignty of
other States. The application of German criminal law to extra-
territorial acts that constitute an offence under the [Code] is
therefore not dependent on the existence of a special domestic
connection. Because the federal Supreme Court has so far
given a different interpretation to [the prior Code provision],
the unambiguous wording of [the Code] now makes it very
clear that offences under the [Code], in any event, do not
require a special domestic link.7 2
The Rwandan genocide in 1994 has led to municipal court universal
jurisdiction prosecutions as well. In Public Prosecutor v. Higaniro, Bel-
gium asserted jurisdiction over a number of Rwandan nationals. 73
Those cases that had not been deferred by Belgian authorities to the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on the tribunal's
request74 were joined and resulted in convictions of the accused in
Belgian courts. 7 5 Not only did Rwanda not protest Belgium's jurisdic-
tion in these cases, it actively collaborated with Belgium by allowing
Belgian rogatory missions on Rwandan territory.76
Another highly successful prosecution of Rwandan genocidiaries
through the use of universal jurisdiction was the Swiss case Military
Prosecutor v. Niyonteze.77 The defendant had fled to Switzerland after the
genocide and was arrested there. The ICTR did not request transfer of
the proceedings. Although it appears that Switzerland denied a Rwan-
dan extradition request, Rwanda later fully cooperated with the Swiss
investigation and proceedings, involving among other things a visit by
71. Id. at 144-45 (discussing Act of 26 June 2002 to Introduce the Code of Crimes Against
International Law (Gesetz zur Einfuhrung des Volkerstrafgesetzbuches) Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I, 2002
Nr 42, 2254).
72. Id. at 145.
73. Id. at 109-11 (citing Assize Court of Brussels 8June 2001).
74. Id. at 144 (noting that the ICTR took over the proceedings of six suspects).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 196-200 (citing Tribunal militaire, Division 2, Lausanne, 30 Apr. 1999 (trial
judgment); Tribunal militaire d'appel IA, Geneva, 26 May 2000 (appeals judgment); Tribunal
militaire de cassation, 27 Apr. 2001 (cassationjudgment)).
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the Swiss court to the site of the alleged universal crime and the
gathering of witness testimony in foreign territory.78
The above-mentioned cases exemplify instances where the territorial
and national states were unable to effectively prosecute criminals
because of internal turmoil. An example of a competent state, free
from destabilizing conflict or its aftermath, simply allowing another
state to prosecute its national was Germany's assent to the Israeli
prosecution of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann following his
abduction from Argentina. v9
Thus, in practice, there is a degree of cooperation between third
states asserting universal jurisdiction and territorial and national states.
This cooperation hints at an underlying custom whereby, as a general
matter, territorial and national states are notified and given priority
over the prosecution, should they wish to pursue it, by states looking to
assert universal jurisdiction. Where territorial or national states decline
to assert jurisdiction, the custodial state proceeds and each state's
sovereignty remains fully in tact. This process fits just as well with
assertions of universal jurisdiction in absentia. If a state wishes to assert
universal jurisdiction in absentia and notifies the territorial or national
state, which in most cases will also be the custodial state, and the
territorial or national state declines to assert jurisdiction and acqui-
esces in the universal jurisdictional claim, no sovereignty infringement
issue arises. Moreover, the in absentia assertion may result in transfer of
the accused to the prosecuting state through extradition or other
means.
More problematic cases are those where the territorial or national
state protests the universal jurisdictional assertion of the third state
either because the territorial or national state wishes to assert jurisdic-
tion and prosecute the accused itself or because it wishes to shield the
accused from all prosecution. Where both states-the territorial/
national state and the third state-are looking to prosecute, the
problem is one of extradition. The custodial state will either extradite
or not, usually based upon extradition treaties and what those treaties
say.80 Thus, cases involving two states looking to prosecute should be
78. Id. at 197-98.
79. Id. at 161.
80. For example, a European nation asserting universaljurisdiction over a Rwandan genocidi-
ary likely would not extradite him to Rwanda upon request because Rwandan law dictates the
death penalty for genocide, a condition that would probably violate the extradition treaty. See 1957
European Convention on Extradition, art. 11, Dec. 13, 1957, Eur., ETS No. 24, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaies/Html/024.htm.
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dealt with by those states' extradition treaties. But what about the
territorial or national state that objects to a universal jurisdictional
assertion by another state because it wishes to insulate the accused from
prosecution? This state will immediately object to the universal jurisdic-
tion in absentia assertion as an infringement of its sovereignty. To
cogently counter this objection, international law must provide a way
for universal jurisdiction in absentia to function that continues to
respect state sovereignty. As will be discussed in the next Section,
international law can and to some extent already does strike this
balance.
D. A Procedure for Pursuing Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia
Any framework for resolving jurisdictional tensions must take ac-
count of the dual, often competing goals of international law: maintain-
ing the international system through peaceful interstate relations on
the one hand and achieving justice or combating impunity on the
other. We begin by looking at the safeguards that the ICJjoint separate
opinion put forth in the Arrest Warrant case.81
The joint separate opinion sets forth five main safeguards to protect
against abuse of universal jurisdiction in absentia.8 2 First, "[n]o exer-
cise of criminal jurisdiction may occur which fails to respect the
inviolability or infringes the immunities of the person concerned[,
but] commencing an investigation on the basis of which an arrest
warrant may later be issued does not of itself violate those principles.,
8 3
Second, the state wishing to assert universal jurisdiction in absentia
"must first offer to the national State of the prospective accused person
the opportunity itself to act upon the charges concerned."8 4 As we have
seen, the territorial state, or state on whose territory the crimes
occurred, also has a "first dibs" claim, along with the state whose
nationals were the victims of the crimes in question and the custodial
state if one exists apart from the national or territorial state. Third, the
charges "may only be laid by a prosecutor or juge d'instruction who acts
in full independence, without links to or control by the government of
that State."8 5 Fourth, there must exist "some special circumstances that
81. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.), 2002
I.c.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal)
59-60.
82. Id.
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do require the exercise of an international criminal jurisdiction and
[these must be] brought to the attention of the prosecutor or juge
d'instruction.'' 1 6 Fifth, universal jurisdiction in absentia must "be exer-
cised only over those crimes regarded as the most heinous by the
international community.
8 7
The first safeguard, that immunities be respected but investigations
may still be conducted, relates to the case that was directly before the
ICJ, as Ndombasi was Congo's Minister of Foreign Affairs. 8 Immunities
should apply, however, only with regard to actual in absentia assertions
of jurisdiction over alleged criminals. Respect for official immunities
obviously protects against the destabilization of international rela-
tions.89 However, investigations should be permitted because, as the
joint separate opinion noted, "[t]he function served by the interna-
tional law of immunities does not require that States fail to keep
themselves informed."90 Moreover, those crimes that are subject to
universal jurisdiction are not subject to statutes of limitations under
international law. 91 So once the cloak of immunity lapses because the
individual has left office, the state wishing to assert universal jurisdic-
tion in absentia could potentially assert jurisdiction over the offense
within the joint separate opinion's criteria. 92 Importantly, the in absen-
tia investigations could serve as a powerful deterrent by signaling to
86. Id. Thejoint separate opinion cites as an example of this one in which "persons related to
the victims of the case will have requested the commencement of legal proceedings." Id.
87. Id. 960.
88. See id. 1 84, 87.
89. See Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Universal
Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. R~v. 337, 338, 354 (2001).
90. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (joint separate opinion
ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal), 1 59.
91. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
ENFORCEMENT 70-71 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
92. This type ofjurisdiction, based on the crime and asserted after immunity of the accused
has lapsed, would constitute "substantive jurisdiction" within the language of the ICJ majority
opinion. The opinion explains:
[lImmunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers of Foreign Affairs does
not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed,
irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual crimi-
nal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is proce-
dural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional
immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it
cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 9 60.
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perpetrators of international crimes that their official positions will not
protect them forever.
The joint separate opinion's second safeguard seeks to ensure the
stable maintenance of international relations as well. By giving the
national state of the prospective accused person "first dibs," the safe-
guard would allow national states to protect against politically moti-
vated accusations by foreign jurisdictions. Moreover, the geopolitical
scrutiny that would accompany a national investigation and trial occur-
ring in the face of a lurking foreign claim would most likely guarantee
at least a threshold good faith effort to investigate and prosecute
serious violations of humanitarian and human rights law.93 Implicit in
this idea of national courts having first priority would, of course, be that
other states respect the rule against doublejeopardy. 94
This safeguard should be qualified, however, for cases where harbor-
ing states intent upon letting grave human rights violators off the hook
engage in a sham investigation/trial to disqualify other claims. For
example, if a foreign state wishing to assert universal jurisdiction in
absentia can prove to a competent international organ, like the ICJ,
that the domestic trial was a sham designed to protect the accused, the
foreign state may pursue thejurisdictional claim in spite of the national
proceeding. Thus, while giving the national state priority is a good idea
insofar as it protects interstate relations, it should not wholly foreclose
the opportunity for other states to prosecute the defendant if the
domestic investigation or trial is proved to be a farce.
Additionally, the state on whose territory the offense occurred (the
territorial state) has a stronger jurisdictional claim and therefore must
have an opportunity to seek prosecution before states that have only
universal jurisdiction in absentia claims. For example, to the extent
93. See Rudiger Wolfrum, The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences Through National
Courts, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 233, 244 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996).
National courts, for example, have a customary obligation under the Geneva Conventions to
pursue such a course of action:
In so far as grave breaches of humanitarian law are prosecuted by national courts,
according to Article 49 paragraph 2 of Geneva Convention (I) ... ; Article 129
paragraph 2 of Geneva Convention (III); Article 146 paragraph 2 of Geneva Conven-
tion (IV), the States have a corresponding obligation to investigate and prosecute such
violations.
Id.
94. It is not clear that all States believe in this rule. See Lotika Sarkan, The Proper Law of Crime,
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50, 55 (Gerhard OW. Mueller & Edward M. Wise eds., 1965).
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that international law considers the cruise ship Achille Lauro Italian
"territory," or subject to jurisdiction via the flag principle, 95 Italian
courts have a stronger jurisdictional claim to prosecute Abu Abbas-
the terrorist who hijacked the ship-than, say, Belgium, even though,
as will be discussed below,9 hijacking a ship is an act of terrorism
subject to universal jurisdiction.
Another jurisdictional claim that should be respected before that of
universal jurisdiction is the passive personality claim. The passive
personality principle "authorizes states to assert jurisdiction over of-
fenses committed against their citizens abroad. It recognizes that each
state has a legitimate interest in protecting the safety of its citizens
when they journey outside national boundaries., 97 In the Achille Lauro
case, then, because the hijackers murdered an American national, the
elderly Klinghoffer, the United States would have a passive personality
claim that takes precedence over a claim of a state assertingjurisdiction
based only on the principle of universality. Lastly, a universal jurisdic-
tional claim should not be pursued in absentia by a non-territorial,
non-national state if the custodial state is willing and able to assert
jurisdiction.
The idea behind the third safeguard, that the investigation or
prosecution be conducted by a prosecutor or juge d'instruction indepen-
dent of any state organ, would theoretically be to prevent charges
brought solely for political motives. Yet, insofar as the jurisdictional
assertion constitutes an exercise of a state's sovereign police power,98
and decisions of national courts evidence state practice and cultivate
rules of customary law,99 wholesale prosecutorial independence seems
somewhat inconsistent with the mechanics of international lawmaking.
Moreover, it appears unlikely that such independence could ever in
fact be achieved-the prosecutor would at least be dependent upon the
state for resources with which to conduct investigations and pursue
indictments. 100
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402 cmt. h,
502(2) (1987).
96. See discussion infra Part III.E.
97. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 188 UordanJ. Paust et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).
98. See Hari M. Osofsky, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Human Rights
Violators to Justice, reprinted inJURISDIcTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 549, 571 (W. Michael Reisman
ed., 1999).
99. G.M. DANILENKO, LAw-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 84-85 (1993).
100. This type of resource dependence certainly exists within the workings of international
criminal tribunals created under the auspices of the United Nations. For example, the Office of
the Independent Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
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The joint separate opinion's fourth safeguard also attempts to de-
politicize universal jurisdiction in absentia assertions by requiring
"special circumstances"- or a source external to the state prosecutor's
office, such as the victim's family-to request commencement of the
proceedings.1 °1 By divesting the state of the power to assert universal
jurisdiction in absentia on its own, the safeguard intends to divorce
political motivations of the state from the initiation of thejurisdictional
claim. Hence, investigations and prosecutions may not be used as
strategic tools against states hostile to the state asserting jurisdiction. 10 2
However, while the presence of victims and their request to the state to
assertjurisdiction creates an interest for that state, making the assertion
dependent upon such a request may be inadequate when viewed from
the standpoint of combating impunity. The political motivation behind
an assertion of universal jurisdiction should have no impact on the
validity of the jurisdictional claim if all other higher-priority states have
declined and any prosecution resulting from the claim is conducted in
line with fundamental due process norms.10 3 Thus, if a state wishes to
assert universal jurisdiction in absentia sua sponte, it should be able to
do so under international law, so long as no other interested state
asserts jurisdiction and the prosecuting state provides for a fair proce-
dure.10 4 States' political policy motivations might prove crucial with
regard to efforts to investigate, arrest, try, and convict perpetrators of
was extremely dependent upon NATO states and, in particular, U.S. funding to conduct its
investigations. Cf Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 87,88 (2001); G. Anthony Wolusky, Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 6 U.S.A.F.
AcAD.J. LEGAL. STUD. 287, 296-97 (1995-1996).
101. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (joint separate opinion
ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 59.
102. This appears to be a prevalent theme in criticism of universal jurisdiction in general. See
Morris, supra note 89, at 338, 354.
103. See sources cited supra note 19.
104. For example, it would be regrettable if Belgium were willing to initiate investigations
against war criminals but was not permitted to do so under international law because it needed to
wait for an external source to bring the charges. Similarly, in light of the United States'
anti-terrorist policy, it is easy to imagine the United States investigating and prosecuting terrorist
hijackers of aircraft. In U.S. v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed the conviction of the defendant hijacker, Fawaz Yunis, under the
passive personality principle because there were two American citizens on board the hijacked
plane (nobody, incidentally, was injured). Id. at 1091. It would be a shame if, absent these two
citizens, the United States could not investigate, arrest, and prosecute the terrorist hijackers
because nobody external to the government brought the charges. See United States v. Yousef, 327
F.3d 56, 107-08 & n.42 (2d Cir. 2003).
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certain universal crimes, like for example, certain acts of international
terrorism. 
10 5
The last safeguard in the joint separate opinion warns that universal
jurisdiction should only be asserted over the most egregious interna-
tional violations. 10 6 While this safeguard seems basic to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction in absentia, it is also quite question-begging.'0 7
The question is what law determines these violations? The answer is
international law. Therefore, prosecutions of universal crimes by na-
tional courts invariably add to the body of international case law and
help to clarify further customary definitions of the crimes. That is,
because universal jurisdiction limits its reach to internationally defined
crimes, its practice by courts invokes international law.' 08 Courts wish-
ing to prosecute on a universaljurisdiction theory cannotjust decide to
adjudicate some subjectively determined crime. Rather, as will be
discussed in Part III, the crime must be a definite and clearly articu-
lated offense of the highest degree under international law. 10 9 Thus,
while universal jurisdiction provides an elastic jurisdiction to courts
wishing to implement international criminal law-even where the
court has no personal jurisdiction over the accused-the universality
principle also limits that jurisdiction to a finite list of substantive
crimes. In short, a state cannot independently determine what consti-
tutes a crime within its universal jurisdiction-this is a matter of
international, not national, law.
Because the practice of universal jurisdiction by courts invokes
international law, it also contributes to the international law governing
crimes of universal jurisdiction. The jurisdictional base used to adjudi-
cate the crime'directs states to use international law as a guide."0 Thus,
states that use the universal jurisdictional base must to some degree
105. See Yousef 327 F.3d at 106-08.
106. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (joint separate opinion
of'Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 1 60.
107. The joint separate opinion seemed to recognize the question-begging nature of this
safeguard. It noted that "[t]he substantive content of the concept of crimes against humanity, and
its status as crimes warranting the exercise of universal jurisdiction, is undergoing change." Id.
62.
108. See, e.g., Yousef 327 F.3d at 100-01.
109. See discussion infra Part III.D.
110. See Diane F. Orentlicher, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction in the New Architecture of
TransnationalJustice, in UNnVERSALJURISDICrION, supra note 1, at 214, 229 (providing examples and
explaining how "courts charged with enforcing the law of humanity are talking to each other,
shaping each other's understanding of the law and, together, constructing a common code of
humanity").
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incorporate international law into their national legislation and/or
implement it throughjudicial performance. The integration of interna-
tional law into domestic legislation and its role in judicial decision-
making aid in the crystallization of customary rules concerning crimes
of universal jurisdiction, thus making the international law itself more
sure and less subject to abuse."'The use of international law, and
perhaps even of international criminal tribunal decisions, as precedent
provides national courts with a pre-established legal framework" 2 and
guards against national courts inventing charges and abusing sentenc-
ing for nefarious reasons while at the same time providing national
organs with a common point of departure.
In sum, while some of the safeguards proposed by the joint separate
opinion are useful, such as respecting immunities and allowing the
national state first priority to prosecute (with a safety-valve for sham
prosecutions), others prove incompatible with the normative goals and
implementational feasibility of the international law of universal juris-
diction. In the end, the model procedure for using universal jurisdic-
tion in absentia requires that:
States wishing to pursue universaljurisdiction in absentia must:
(1) Respect immunities with regard to the formal issuance of an
arrest warrant, but this respect does not prevent investigations
into criminal charges;
(2) Offer to the national state, territorial state, and state whose
national was harmed, as well as to the custodial state, the
111. This idea that national law acts as an extension and activation of international law
appears most clearly in the theory of monism. Monism, or the unification of international law with
national law, not only actualizes international norms but also restricts national legal action. As
Hans Kelsen explained:
[T]he international legal order is significant only as part of a universal legal order
which comprises also all the national legal orders ... the international legal order
determines the territorial, personal, and temporal spheres of validity of the national
legal orders, thus making possible the coexistence of a multitude of states .... [T]he
international legal order restricts the material sphere of validity of the national legal
orders by subjecting them to a certain regulation of their own matters that could
otherwise have been arbitrarily regulated by the state concerned.
HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (2d ed. 1966).
112. The joint separate opinion seemed to implicitly recognize this by drawing upon the
ICTY, ICTR, and ICC Statutes as well as precedents from the two international criminal tribunals
in its discussion of whether the arrest warrant against Ndombasi alleged the commission of
established crimes under international law. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of I 1 April 2000, 2002
I.C.J. 121 (joint separate opinion ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 161.
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opportunity to act upon the charges concerned before assert-
ingjurisdiction in absentia.
As noted, domestic courts also must implement international law in the
proceedings. On a theoretical level, such implementation would ap-
pear unavoidable, as the definition of the crime-and hence the
capacity and exercise of jurisdiction-is a matter of international
law.' 1 3 Because universal jurisdiction is customary and not treaty-based
(otherwise it could not be universal unless all nations in the world
signed and ratified the relevant treaty-something that has not hap-
pened as to any treaty), and by its nature derives from the customary
definition of the crime allowing forjurisdiction (as reflected, of course,
in positive -instruments), national courts are constrained to use the
customary international law governing the definition of the crime in
order to exercise universal jurisdiction. This confluence of interna-
tional legal jurisdiction and substance is indeed perhaps the most
innovative characteristic of universal jurisdiction.
E. Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia as a Vehicle for International Law
and Policy
This Section will argue that universal jurisdiction in absentia helps,
not hurts, interstate relations because it provides for signaling between
states and clarifies custom in a way that affords states more options to
act against perpetrators of international crime and, in the process,
promotes international focus on human rights. It will then look at the
practical effects of universal jurisdiction in absentia to argue that such
jurisdiction does, in fact, combat impunity by providing a measure of
punishment and deterrence of serious international crime.
1. Developing Custom and Interstate Relations
As discussed, universal jurisdiction in absentia poses a challenge to
the traditional parameters of state sovereignty by disrespecting a state's
prerogative to harbor accused international criminals. 1 4 The ability of
non-territorial and non-national states to undermine a harboring
state's decision to protect those within its territory gives rise to concerns
that the non-territorial and non-national states seeking prosecutions
113. SeegeneraUy Yousef, 327 F.3d at 100-01.
114. Seediscussion supra Part I.B.
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will abuse universal jurisdiction toward their own political ends.1 15 To
be sure, even the usual exercise of universal jurisdiction by a custodial
state-for example, universal jurisdiction where the accused is physi-
cally present in the state assertingjurisdiction-has been subject to this
type of criticism.1 16 Rather than damaging interstate relations, how-
ever, in absentia assertions over universal crimes offer a creative
doctrinal modification of the usual exercise of universal jurisdiction
that helps maintain interstate relations where these relations would
otherwise be threatened through universal jurisdictional assertions
based on the presence of the accused. Moreover, universal jurisdiction
in absentia tends to support the development of interstate relations in a
manner considerate of human rights.
Instead of acting as a threat, universal jurisdiction in absentia con-
verges with the objective of securing stable interstate relations by
promoting diplomatic state interaction and producing a more compre-
hensive, clear, and uniform rule of customary international law. These
types of assertions do so by providing a notice or signaling function
among states while supplying a diplomatic vehicle for curtailing human
rights violations."1
7
Because jurisdictional assertions constitute an exercise "'peculiarly
115. See Morris, supra note 89, at 338, 354; Alfred P. Rubin, Is International Criminal Law
"Universal"?, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 351,369 (2001); Bertram S. Brown, UniversalJurisdiction: Myths,
Realities, and Prospects: The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 383, 390
(2001).
116. Madeline Morris observes that the politicization of even usual (non-in absentia)
universal jurisdictional assertions proves problematic because "criminal trials for war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity do not exist in isolation from those other aspects of
interstate relations ... states may exercise universal jurisdiction as a means of gaining advantage
over their opponents in interstate conflict." Morris, supra note 89, at 354. As a preliminary point, it
is far from clear that the possibility of states employing universal jurisdiction in absentia for
"political" reasons necessarily conflicts with the purposes of international criminal law. If the
charges brought by a state that has strong enough interest in going after the accused are
substantiated, wouldn't the exercise of universal jurisdiction through the national judicial process
be more consistent with international law than simply hunting the accused down and killing him?
If the accused is found guilty under a fair trial procedure, he is one more international criminal
who will not escape with impunity for failure of the national or territorial state to prosecute. See
Wolfrnm, supra note 93, at 235; Osofsky, supra note 98, at 564. So long as there is sufficient
evidence to support the charge according to relevant municipal standards, that the motivation
behind the assertion ofjurisdiction may have been based in part on political considerations does
not detract from the validity of thejurisdictional claim. This is especially so if the prosecuting state
follows a sovereignty-respectful procedure for resolving concurrent claims among states like the
one laid out above. See discussion supra Part IID.
117. This Section will use "notice" and "signal" interchangeably depending on the context of
the sentence.
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sovereign in nature' . . . [w]hen one state interferes with criminal
violations of another state's law occurring in that other state, [the
interfering state] opens itself to sovereignty and legitimacy criti-
cisms.,,118 It follows that sovereignty and legitimacy concerns chill the
potential exercise of universal jurisdiction within the international
forum for fear of how the jurisdictional assertion might be perceived by
other states.119 Yet universal jurisdiction in absentia might actually
work to pre-establish the legitimacy of the extraterritorial jurisdictional
claim and consequently to protect sovereignty interests. Under the
model that mandates "first dibs" to the national, territorial, and passive
personality states, the jurisdictional assertion acts as a notice provider
to other states whose nationals are being subject to the asserting state's
jurisdictional claim. As a result of this notice, the territorial and
national states, which under international law have stronger jurisdic-
tional interests, 20 are afforded certain options that further the mainte-
nance of interstate relations.
For instance, a national state put on notice by another state's
assertion of universal jurisdiction in absentia may either: (i) decide to
take matters into its own hands-it could conduct an investigation and
prosecution of the accused, both in order to guarantee a fair trial and
also effectively to counter false claims of criminality asserted against any
of its own nationals;1 2' or (ii) if the state feels that the jurisdictional
assertion over its national is invalid, it could take steps to resolve the
conflict, for example, by bringing the issue to an international judicial
organ like the ICJ.
Indeed, this latter option is precisely what the Democratic Republic
of the Congo pursued when it learned that the Belgian investigating
magistrate had issued the "international arrest warrant in absentia"
118. Osofsky, supra note 98, at 571 (quoting the U.S. Supreme Court in SaudiArabia v. Nelson,
507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993)).
119. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785,
840 (1988) ("[S]tates may fail to prosecute criminals ... due to political and foreign policy
considerations. The value to society of punishing one criminal, however egregious the crime, may
not override the possible repercussions of another state's jurisdictional challenge and charge of
political and parochial bias.").
120. "It had long been accepted that a State was entitled to apply its legislative (or
prescriptive) authority to events and persons within its territory and to its nationals outside of the
country. 'Territoriality' and 'nationality' were referred to as 'bases' ofjurisdiction and functioned
as criteria of permissible authority." SCHACHTER, supra note 14, at 254.
121. Although, "the fact that some States do not accept the prohibition against double
jeopardy enhances the possibility that a person acqtitted in one State may be tried and punished
in another." Id. at 270.
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against Ndombasi. 22 Had Belgium waited until Ndombasi came onto
Belgian soil to assert universal jurisdiction and then issued the warrant
and arrested, tried, and convicted him, the consequences to interstate
relations between Belgium and Congo would most likely have been
more explosive and irreparable. Instead, because the Belgian court
employed universal jurisdiction in absentia, Congo was put on notice
and, as a result, was able to pursue peaceful avenues of international
redress. 123 Furthermore, the nature of that redress, taking the form of a
World Court decision and mandate to Belgium, 124 carried the stamp of
legitimacy.
Moreover, and of equal importance, this type of interstate resolution
of universal jurisdictional claims made possible through the signaling
function provided by in absentia assertions engenders a more compre-
hensive and uniform rule of customary international law with respect to
universal jurisdiction in general. Universal jurisdiction is a fundamen-
tally customary, not treaty-based, law. 125 Customary international law is
established through state practice and opiniojuris, or the official belief
that the practice is legal.1 26 These two prongs create a paradoxical
effect which stunts the full development of a customary rule with
regard to prosecuting crimes of universal jurisdiction. The rule can
mature only from states practicing universal jurisdiction. But the fact
that states fear the opinio juris illegitimacy of universal jurisdiction
because of the present vagueness of the customary rule 27 prevents
them from practicing this form ofjurisdictional assertion. This lack of
122. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Beig.),
2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14).
123. See id.
124. Id. 1 78 (finding that because of Ndombasi's immunity as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
"the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April
2000 and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circulated").
125. As Professor Arnell has explained:
[I]t is only customary international law that can generally prescribe this type of
international crime. It is incorrect to aver that treaties can generally prescribe certain
acts. One of the most elementary rules of the law of treaties is that they do not create
rights or obligations for States without their consent. Certainly there is nothing to
prevent States from entering into agreements prescribing or proscribing certain acts
interse, but these do not create crimes in general international law.
Paul Arnell, International Criminal Law and Universal Jurisdiction, 11 INT'L LEGAL PERSp. 53, 57
(1999).
126. CfJ.L. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 52 (6th ed. 1963).
127. See Osofsky, supra note 98, at 573.
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state practice inevitably consigns universal jurisdiction to an embryonic
status under international law.
However, through their signaling function, assertions of in absentia
universal jurisdictional may ensure ex-ante that a given jurisdictional
assertion is acceptable from the standpoint of the territorial or national
state and from the perspective of the international community as a
whole.1 28 This ex-ante recognition could liberate the acting state from
the constraints of potential legitimacy and sovereignty concerns arising
retrospectively. In turn, such freedom-to-act would lead to more asser-
tions of universal jurisdiction and more universal jurisdiction proceed-
ings, consequently prompting the development of a clearer and more
uniform rule of customary international law through state practice,
while simultaneously and reciprocally enforcing the legitimacy of that
practice, thus satisfying opinio juris. Production of the customary rule
along these lines would both clarify the substantive law of universal
jurisdiction and construct certain features congenial to the mainte-
nance of interstate relations in line with the procedural model for
concurrentjurisdictional claims outlined above.
In line with the procedural model, the in absentia notice function
would promote diplomatic recourse among states by making available
options by which disputes involving universal jurisdictional claims
could be settled prudently and judiciously through peaceful means.129
Even where interstate relations have severely deteriorated, such notice
would still allow opportunity for political gamesmanship, whereas
employment of a non-pre-announced arrest policy and trial would be
more likely to provoke hostile and perhaps even military action 130 (for
128. For example, Israel's assertion of jurisdiction over Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal, for
crimes committed against persons who were not Israeli citizens (Holocaust victims), came under
criticism for the method of bringing Eichmann before the court after Israel had already acted. See
Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962); R. Higgins, Allocating Competence:
Jurisdiction, injURISDICION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 98, at 267. While these criticisms
called into question the legitimacy of the State of Israel's seizure of Eichmann in Argentina (where
Eichnnann was "hiding out") in order to bring him to trial, no states protested Israel's right to assert
jurisdiction over the offenses. Id.
129. Again, a prime example of this would be Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 1l April 2000.
130. On October 23, 2000, the Arab League of Nations issued a statement that "Arab nations
shall pursue, in accordance with international law, those responsible for these brutal practices"
against Palestinians carried out by Israelis in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Arab Statement:
"Criminals of War Who Committed Massacres, "N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 2000, at A12. The announcement
at least provides notice to Israel that Israeli perpetrators will be pursued in Arab nations. This
would appear to be the best alternative for the maintenance of international relations if the other
option considered would be Arab nations simply arresting Israelis without warning. Such arrests
could easily incite military action.
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example, if Belgian police had simply begun arresting accused univer-
sal criminals found on Belgian territory).
In addition, the in absentia claim provides national states a "first
dibs" opportunity to examine international criminal charges through
their own investigations and prosecutions. In this manner, the in
absentia claim would force a more universal recognition and assess-
ment of the international crimes at issue-especially, for instance, if a
national state seeking to invalidate charges against one of its citizens
looks to demonstrate its national's innocence on the world stage,13 1
perhaps to guard against states which do not accept the prohibition on
double jeopardy. 132 It does not necessarily follow that these domestic
investigations and/or trials would be sham efforts to cover up the crime
and protect the national perpetrator. The diplomatic and media
publicity flowing from the foreign state's in absentia assertion based on
evidentiary support would ensure a sufficient amount of international
observation at home so as to secure an acceptable threshold of national
investigation and legal evaluation. When measured against the alterna-
tives of (i) no investigation and (ii) deterioration of interstate relations
resulting from actual arrests (where no notice is given to the national
state and its national is arrested in the foreign territory), the national
investigatory/prosecutory option afforded by the in absentia notice
might provide a satisfactory solution to the competing interests of
combating impunity and maintaining interstate relations.
Through the notice function, the territorial or national state, as well
as the international community, also would have an opportunity to
evaluate the in absentia assertion with regard to the substance of the
131. An example would be bringing a case before the International Court ofJustice. Had the
World Court gone to the merits of the case concerning Ndombasi, it would have had to decide the
substantive question of whether universal jurisdiction applied to charges of incitement to racial
hatred. As the joint separate opinion noted:
As regards ... charges of incitement to racial hatred, which are said to have led to
murders and lynchings, ... [f]itting of this charge within the generally understood
substantive context of crimes against humanity is not without its problems. "Racial
hatred" would need to be assimilated to "persecution on racial grounds", or, on the
particular facts to mass murder and extermination. Incitement to perform any of these
acts is not in terms listed in the usual definitions of crimes against humanity, nor is it
explicitly mentioned in the Statutes of the ICTY or the ICTR, nor in the Rome Statute
for the ICC.
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.CJ. 121
(Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 64.
132. See SCHACHTER, supra note 14, at 270.
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crimes being alleged. Marked by its pliability and uncertainty, 133 substan-
tive international criminal law proves especially hazardous for sover-
eignty maximizing states (as all states by nature tend to be) looking to
assert universal jurisdiction over particular offenses that marginally
qualify as universal crimes.13 4 The diplomatic interplay furnished by in
absentia signaling could provide more instances of extradition and
adjudication of international crimes under the theory of universal
jurisdiction than the vastly underutilized practice as it presently stands. 1
35
Because the decisions of national courts, and the domestic legislation
that provides the basis for those decisions, evidence state practice,
136
the corpus of case law generated by in absentia assertions would
contribute to formulation of the customary rule. Again, however,
where a national state wishes to counter the substantive dimension of
the criminal charge, the state would always have occasion to conduct its
own investigation and/or trial-which would still contribute to the
international custom. By encouraging this type of aut dedere autjudicare
principle 37 through its signaling function, universal jurisdiction in
absentia helps combat impunity, maintain stable interstate relations,
and solidify the customary rule of universal jurisdiction.
133. Arnell, supra note 125, at 63 ("Indeed, dispute and uncertainty will inevitably prevail as
new acts come to be included, or as previously defined international crimes fall into desuetude.").
134. See Randall, supra note 119, at 840.
135. Id. at821:
[P]robably few [states] would protest the prosecution of their nationals for acts of
hijacking, hostage taking, crimes against internationally protected persons, torture, or
apartheid . . . . Rather than complain to the prosecuting state or to an international
body, [the State] actually might distance itself from the defendant and the alleged
offense, especially in light of the general condemnation of these particular acts.
136. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (joint
separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal) 22, 45; see also D.NILENKO, supra
note 99, at 84:
An analysis of the practice of the I.C.J. reveals that in determining customary law it takes
into account many diverse manifestations of state conduct. Significantly, the I.C.J. relies
not only on acts and actions emanating from organs responsible for foreign relations
but also on legislative acts and judgments handed down by municipal courts.
137. The aut dedere autjudicare principle holds that "[i] nstead of conducting the prosecution
itself ... the home State or detaining power may extradite a person to another State party
interested in the prosecution." Wolfrum, supra note 93, at 244.
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2. Combating Impunity
The exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia also helps combat
impunity. The recent human rights explosion in international law has
begun to collapse absolute state sovereignty. 138 As a result, certain
human rights abuses are now of international concern despite the
absence of traditional international jurisdictional ties. 13 9 In order to
"fill in the gaps" and resolve the "law enforcement crisis" in interna-
tional criminal law, 140 states should have the option to prosecute
crimes under the theory of universal jurisdiction, thereby constructing
a more comprehensive international law enforcement mechanism.
14
'
In so doing, "national courts act instead of international organs. Seen
in this light, these state courts act as instruments of the decentralized
enforcement of international law." 1 4 2 Within this view, the universality
principle is favorable, not inimical, toward the security of interstate
relations because prosecuting states would in fact be acting for the
benefit of all states by protecting fundamental interests of the interna-
tional system as a whole.
By enabling states to conduct investigations and issue arrest warrants
in absentia over grave violations of international law, universal jurisdic-
tion in absentia advances the fight against impunity. 4 3 Where custody
138. See Osofsky, supra note 98, at 563; see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 564-80 (4th ed. 1990).
139. BROWNLIE, supra note 138, at 564-80; see generally UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 1;
REYDAMS, supra note 3.
140. G.O.W. Mueller & DouglasJ. Besharov, Evolution and Enforcement ofInternational Criminal
Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 62 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986) ("The current
state... of I.C.L. [International Criminal Law] is marked by a law enforcement crisis, and, unless
this crisis is resolved-or resolves itself in evolutionary fashion-the development of I.C.L. will
have arrived at its terminal point-short of the goal.").
141. Whether universal jurisdiction creates an option or an obligation to prosecute is a point
of some debate. Whether a state has a right or an obligation to prosecute appears to turn on
whether the state exercises jurisdiction pursuant to a treaty or customary international law; the
treaty creating an obligation and customary law creating the right. Randall, supra note 119, at
819-24. It would seem that the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Burgenthal rightly concluded that universal jurisdiction may only be exercised pursuant to
customary international law and therefore creates a right rather than an obligation to prosecute.
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.]. 121 (joint separate opinion ofJudges
Higgins, Kooijmans & Burgenthal) J 42, 44; see also Morris, supra note 89, at 349.
142. Wolfrum, supra note 93, at 236.
143. See RichardJ. Goldstone, InternationalJurisdiction and Prosecutorial Crimes, 47 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 473,477 (1999):
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over offenders may be difficult or even impossible to obtain, 144 states
should have the ability to pursue these types of claims. Indeed, the only
other alternatives are (i) inaction and (ii) abducting the offender and
bringing him within the state territory. Inaction results in an effective
grant of impunity for the criminal and is therefore plainly contrary to
the purpose of international criminal law. On the other hand, trans-
border abduction is certainly more suspect under international law
than an in absentia assertion in line with the procedural model-which
is considerate of national and territorial state interests-and abduction
would also no doubt lead more directly to interstate conflict.1 45
Unlike inaction or abduction, which represent opposing extremes
that only achieve one international objective at the expense of the
other, state action taken pursuant to universal jurisdiction in absentia
provides a balanced option useful to both international law goals of
combating impunity and developing beneficial interstate relations. It
engenders a deterrent effect on potential international criminals,
communicates an important geopolitical message to harboring states,
and leads to increased national judicial operation with respect to
international crime.
a. Punishment/Deterrence of International Criminals
Universal jurisdiction in absentia serves as a type of punishment of
offenders, keeping them in hiding and preventing them from moving
So the message has gone out. It has gone out to past and present leaders, whether
political or military, that they can no longer travel freely, for it is likely that warrants for
their arrest would have been issued against them. This message must have some
deterrent effect. It is certainly a positive development, both from a moral point of view,
and from the point of view of international justice.
144. Randall, supra note 119, at 840.
145. Abduction, or irregular rendition, is "the forceful abduction of an individual from one
country by agents of another country, principally without the knowledge or consent of the
former." Melanie M. Laflin, Kidnapped Terrorists: Bringing International Criminals to Justice Through
Irregular Rendition and Other Quasi-Legal Options, 26J. LEGIs. 315, 315 (2000). This rule is based
upon the principle that "exercise of physical force by one State in the territory of another State
without the latter's consent constitutes an excess of international jurisdiction." F.A. Mann,
Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAw
AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 407 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989); see also Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure
and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B OF INT'L LAw 279, 280 (1960) (explaining that abduction is
considered illegal under international law because it is an invasion of the territorial sovereignty of
the state from which the alleged offender was abducted).
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freely within the international community. 146 The possibility of arrest
also deters future offenders by publicizing the fact that a territorial,
national, or harboring state's protection or inaction no longer provides
insulation from investigations and charges of grave international law
violations. 147 A thorough investigation not only adds to international
pressure on states harboring accused criminals, it preserves a record
and evidence of the crimes. Moreover, the geopolitical impact that
accompanies prosecutorial and judicial initiatives communicates a
powerful message that grave violations of international law will not be
tolerated. And this message discreetly, or perhaps not-so-discreetly,
works to promote human rights with regard to international decision-
making.
The case of Ndombasi may serve as a hypothetical example. Belgium
sought to prosecute him for crimes against humanity, including geno-
cide. In line with our model for pursuing the charges, let us assume
Ndombasi does not have diplomatic immunity-say he has retired and
thus his procedural immunity as a state official has expired. Further, let
us assume Belgium gives Congo "first dibs" on Ndombasi-i.e., the
opportunity to investigate and prosecute him first-and Congo de-
clines this opportunity. Now suppose Belgium asserts jurisdiction in
absentia by conducting an investigation and issuing an indictment and
arrest warrant for Ndombasi for genocide. Because of the timeliness of
the investigation and assertion, Belgium is able to use evidence that
otherwise might be lost and witnesses that otherwise might die or
disappear. And with this evidence Belgium establishes a strong case
against Ndombasi.
To be sure, Ndombasi will not be traveling to Belgium. Indeed, he
may refuse to leave Congo for fear of being served or arrested on an
airplane somewhere over Belgian territory or through some other
unlikely but all-the-same risky scenario. At least in this way, the in
absentia assertion imprisons Ndombasi within a certain territory. Addi-
tionally, he must live out his days knowing that an arrest warrant for
crimes against humanity stands against him, enduring whatever accom-
panying impact such a warrant has on his conscience, career, and
reputation. In the end, there will be forever a full evidentiary and legal
record of the charges and crimes supporting the warrant, and this in
itself furthers international criminal law and human rights.
There is also the possibility that some future event will force him out
146. Goldstone, supra note 143, at 476-77.
147. Id.
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of hiding. For example, Abbas, who had been hiding out in Iraq, could
no longer evade criminal responsibility within its borders because the
regime that had protected him had been taken out of power and the
new authority wanted him to face justice. 4 Theoretically, something
similar could happen in Congo, perhaps through a civil war or coup, or
even an election, after which the government no longer wishes to
protect Ndombasi. If this happens, like in the case of Abbas, evidence
may be too old and too hard to marshal. It is fortunate that Italy already
fully investigated the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and conducted the
full trial in absentia in Abbas' case in order to preserve the evidentiary
record and prevent Abbas from escapingjustice for his crimes.1 49
But there is another, just as important function that the in absentia
assertion could serve in the case of Ndombasi once he is no longer
immune. International publication of and attention directed toward
the assertion would be considerable. At some point Congo-even if it
still wishes to protect Ndombasi-might become a little uncomfortable.
Interstate relations may become somewhat awkward and even damaged
(especially with Belgium, which may have strong ties to its former
colony).1 50 This discomfort and awkwardness might even impact eco-
nomic and political negotiations and agreements with other states and
international bodies; it could adversely affect trade, diplomacy, and
even international perceptions of Congo's sovereignty. Indeed, in light
of the standing warrant, Congo might decide that protecting Ndombasi
simply would not be worth the trouble and thus extradite him to
Belgium or give him up to the Belgian authorities in some other
manner simply to be rid of the problem. Or perhaps Congo might feel
that it must demonstrate to the world that it is not harboring an
international criminal and might conduct its own investigation and/or
hold its own trial. At this point it would be difficult for Congo to
orchestrate a complete sham trial because too many eyes would be
watching, including those in Belgium. In fact, the entire purpose of the
investigation and trial would be to show fairness. Further, this trial
would not supersede or displace the Belgian warrant; Congo would
148. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Considers Indicting Terrorist Arrested in Iraq on Achille Lauro Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at B7.
149. Id. (noting that "[t]he United States also brought a criminal complaint against Mr.
Abbas in the mid-1980's, but withdrew it after problems developed with the evidence provided by
foreign nations. Officials say United States prosecutors will have to grapple with some of these
same problems in deciding whether to indict Mr. Abbas now ... ").
150. See REIDAMS, supra note 3, at 109 (describing that Belgium has maintained "many and
important" contacts with another former territory, Rwanda).
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already have been offered and would have declined the "first dibs"
opportunity. The Belgian warrant could still have effect and Ndombasi
would likely still not venture into potentially dangerous international
waters. Prospectively, Congo would be careful to discourage conduct
hostile to international law for fear of having to go through the entire
ordeal again. To be sure, the very fact that the ICJ case took place with
respect to Ndombasi's conduct has likely already influenced Congolese
governmental policy in this regard.
b. Practical Feasibility
Universal jurisdiction in absentia also allows domestic courts-and
the international enforcement mechanism performed through those
courts-more opportunities to fight impunity through national judicial
operation. Starting from the empirical premise that universal jurisdic-
tion is, in practice, vastly underutilized,15 1 the opportunities afforded
by in absentia jurisdictional assertions provide crucial contributions to
the formation and clarification of customary rules concerning the
prosecution of grave international crimes.
Skeptics argue that if the state exercising universal jurisdiction in
absentia has no links to the crime or the criminal, that state is in a poor
position to evaluate and gather evidence, take testimonials, and build a
reliable case against the accused for trial. 152 There are at least two
responses to this criticism. First, evidence- and testimony-gathering
difficulties apply to other types ofjurisdictional bases as well, and these
types of jurisdiction have served as the basis for legitimate criminal
prosecutions. 153 Second, the failure to immediately investigate crimes
151. See Randall, supra note 119, at 839-40.
152. See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 301, 374-400 (2003); SCHACHTER, supra note 14, at 269:
The apparent expansion of universal jurisdiction ... raises questions as to the protec-
tion which the accused should be accorded in view of the absence of links of
territoriality, or nationality or of any special State security interest. Can the accused
plead forum non conveniens or demand a trial in a country in which the evidence and
witnesses would be available for his defense?
153. Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and
Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. 65, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (1999); see also
Anthony D'Amato, National Prosecution for International Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
ENFORCEMENT 169 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987) (describing difficulties in applying interna-
tional law).
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of universal jurisdiction risks the loss of crucial evidence, without which
a conviction might not be possible.
Evidence- and testimony-gathering problems are by no means unique
to universal jurisdiction in absentia. Under the nationality source of
jurisdiction, and certainly the passive personality source, where states
exercise jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim but the
crime is committed in foreign territory,154 the same evidence-gathering
burden exists. Despite this problem, national courts reticent to exercise
universal jurisdiction in absentia have not hesitated to apply passive
personality jurisdiction in absentia-or even to conduct trials, obtain
convictions, and sentence criminals in absentia. 55
Also, any evidentiary hurdle that confronts universal jurisdiction in
absentia arguably faces the usual form of universal jurisdiction (where
the court has custody over the accused). Simply because the offender is
located on the territory does not somehow make evidence gathering
and compiling witness testimony any easier. 156 The crimes being pros-
ecuted under the principle of universal jurisdiction still occurred
within a foreign territory. To be sure, international law should not
throw out these otherjurisdictional bases that involve foreign evidence
gathering (and the prosecutions resulting from them) under the
premise that the evidence gathering might be difficult.
On the other hand, if a state forestalls investigations and evidence
gathering because the offender is not within its borders, crucial time-
sensitive evidence may disappear before a thorough investigation can
be conducted and a sound case brought. This delay could wipe out the
possibility of conviction and result in an effective grant of impunity.
Furthermore, United Nations resolutions and numerous international
conventions impose on states the duty to assist in "the identification
and location of persons, the taking of testimony and the production of
evidence, the service of documents, the arrest or detention of persons
and the extradition of accused persons."157
154. See SCHACHTER, supra note 14, at 254.
155. FIONA McKAY, REDRESS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: LAW AND CASES IN TEN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 26 (1999) (Using the passive personality principle, on March 16, 1990, a
French court convicted and sentenced Argentine Captain Alfredo Astiz to life imprisonment in
absentia for the torture and disappearance of two French nuns in Argentina.), available at
http://www.redress.org/publications/UJEurope.pdf.
156. Unless, of course, one argues that the offender will come forward with sufficient
evidence of his crimes.
157. Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of
Universal Jurisdiction (1999) (summarizing declarations of the UN General Assembly Resolution
3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973, Principles of International Co-Operation in the Detection,
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In fact, state courts have successfully taken this type of extraterritorial
investigative action and prosecuted universal criminals on the evidence
obtained. In a case against a Rwandan national, Vincent Ntezimana, a
Belgian investigating magistrate relied upon evidence obtained from
several African states and from interviews with suspects in the custody
of the ICTR to reject Ntezimana's claim that there was neither suffi-
cient nor credible evidence to support charges of genocide.
15 8 Simi-
larly, as already discussed, 159 a Swiss military tribunal conducted a
transnational investigation in order to build its case against a Rwandan
national for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Re-
dress reports that "[t]wo rogatory missions had been to Rwanda to
collect testimony and other evidence, and the court itself visited
Rwanda. Exceptional measures were taken to ensure the protection of
witnesses, who came from Rwanda and elsewhere in Europe to give
evidence."1 60
In short, state courts presently conduct productive transnational
investigations in cases under traditional notions of universal jurisdic-
tion where the court has personaljurisdiction over the accused in order
to bring well-founded charges against perpetrators of heinous interna-
tional crimes, and thereby effectively combat impunity. There is no
reason why states should not continue this practice through the same
investigatory methodology under the principle of universal jurisdiction
in absentia.
It is unfortunate that states refuse to take advantage of universal
jurisdiction in absentia simply because the offender is not located
within the state's territory and cannot be brought to court. For ex-
ample, in deciding the jurisdictional question with regard to Serb
perpetrators accused of ethnic cleansing, the French Cour de cassation
"adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope of judicial powers
implied by universal jurisdiction; they declared that no universal juris-
diction exists as long as the perpetrator is not on French territory, not
Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity; as well as provisions of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide; the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War and Additional Protocol
I; the Convention Against Torture; the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investiga-
tion of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions; and the UN Declaration on the Protec-
tion of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
index/engior530011999?OpenDocument.
158. See McKAY, supra note 155, at 19-20.
159. See discussion supra Part II.C.
160. SeeMcKAY, supra note 155, at 42.
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even thejurisdiction to try to ascertain his whereabouts."'16' The Courde
cassation's decision placed the burden on the victims to prove that the
accused perpetrators were in French territory. 162 As a result of this
decision, the French National Consultative Commission on Human
Rights immediately issued an opinion calling on the French govern-
ment to better ensure French enforcement of international human
rights through universal jurisdiction. 163 The opinion further criticized
the court's placement of the burden of proving the presence of
suspects on French territory on the victims as prohibitively difficult and
unfair. 1 64 Regrettably, these perpetrators of egregious human rights
violations may never face any international legal consequence for their
acts because of France's unwillingness to employ universal jurisdiction
in absentia.
The theoretical premise and operational implementation of univer-
sal jurisdiction in absentia promote international criminal law objec-
tives by advancing the struggle against impunity and providing redress
for grave human rights violations where the alternative, as has been
proved in practice, is internationaljudicial inaction. Universal j urisdic-
tion in absentia moreover may be exercised in a way that respects
sovereignty and the maintenance of interstate relations. Putting these
types of jurisdictional assertions into practice would cultivate a more
comprehensive customary rule while, on a practical level, inducing
increased international interaction in response to universal crimes.
Focusing state interaction and consequently communication on univer-
sal crimes would lead to global publicity and perhaps cooperation in
bringing perpetrators of these crimes to justice, thereby heightening
international awareness of the crimes themselves and the legitimacy of
the criminal proceedings.
III. A MODERN CATEGORY OF UNIVERSAL CRIME
As noted in the Introduction, 165 expansive readings now argue for
inclusion under the universal jurisdiction rubric the offenses of geno-
cide, slavery, torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and perhaps
161. Brigitte Stern, UniversalJurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity Under French Law-Grave
Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949-Genocide-Torture-Human Rights Violations in Bosnia and
Rwanda, 93 AM.J. INT',L L. 525, 527 (1999).
162. See id.
163. McKA', supra note 155.
164. Id.
165. Seediscussion supra Part I.A.
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terrorism.166 The opening up of the modern universal jurisdiction
category is the result of an increase in international treaties, municipal
legislation, and international and municipal tribunal decisions dealing
with these crimes. 16 7 The international consensus on the gravity of
these offenses combines with the expansive jurisdictional provisions
contained in treaties and municipal legislation to indicate the availabil-
ity of universal jurisdiction over the offenses as a matter of customary
law. 168 Because the crime itself is universal under customary interna-
tional law, the definition of the crime is also a matter of custom. The
most handy definitions of crimes of universal jurisdiction, however, are
found in positive law embodied in the statutes of international tribu-
nals and in international treaties.1 69 But these definitions are not
definitive; they merely reflect and codify the underlying customary
international law.
1 70
Historically, the first crime of universal jurisdiction was piracy.17 1
Judge Moore's dissenting opinion in the famous Lotus case in the
Permanent Court of International Justice has been recognized as a
good starting point for describing the crime's universal nature.
172
166. See THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICIMON, supra note 12, princ. 2(1), at
29 (Serious Crimes Under International Law); SCHACHTER, supra note 14, at 268.
167. See Steiner, supra note 4, at 205-06 (noting that municipal universal jurisdiction
legislation might incorporate the precise definitions of these crimes that are set forth in
one or another treaty-the Genocide or Torture Convention, the Geneva Conventions
and their Protocols, and so on-or in other international instruments such as the
Security Council-approved Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
168. See discussion infra Part III.E (describing the process by which certain acts of terrorism
become universal).
169. See CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 2 (1965); Steiner,
supra note 4, at 205.
170. PARRY, supra note 169, at 2. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal refused to apply
crimes against humanity, which had been specified in the statute conferring jurisdiction on the
Tribunal, to crimes preceding 1939, the year that World War II commenced. The Tribunal held
that crimes against humanity were established by customary international law by 1939, but there
was no evidence that customary international law had recognized crimes against humanity at any
particular date prior to 1939. SeeTrial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal-Judgment (Int'l Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, 1947), reprinted in 22 THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
(1950).
171. SeeBASsIOUNI, supra note 1, at 40.
172. See BROWNLIE, supra note 138, at 238.
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Piracy by law of nations ... is sui generis. Though statutes may
provide for its punishment, it is an offence against the law of
nations; and as the scene of the pirate's operations is the high
seas, which it is not the right or duty of any nation to police, he
is denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is
treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind-hostis
humani generis-whom any nation may in the interest of all
capture and punish.
17 3
The universal nature of the crime of piracy developed out of two basic
necessities. One was the necessity to provide for forums to prosecute
crimes committed in an area outside the territorial jurisdiction of any
state-the high seas. The other necessity was to combat an offense that
indiscriminately attacked all states but for which no state could be held
responsible. The crime caused often severe economic and diplomatic
damage in a way that threatened all states, and its harmful nature
therefore stemmed from its destabilizing effect not only on individual
states but also on the international order that these states comprised.
Evolutions in international law and changing global circumstances
have led to the expansion of the universal jurisdiction taxonomy. As
Judge Kaufman wrote for the United States Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, "it is clear that courts must interpret
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today. '1 74 Finding torture a violation of
customary international law, Judge Kaufman pronounced, "[T] he tor-
turer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. 175 Similarly, Malvina Halber-
stam draws a direct connection between acts of piracy and certain acts
of terrorism:
Both the theoretical justification and the pragmatic necessity
for universal jurisdiction apply to such acts. Terrorists today,
like pirates of old, are a threat to all states and no state is willing
to assume responsibility for their acts. Since they do not confine
their attacks to the vessels of a particular state, but attack vessels
and nationals of many states indiscriminately, they are hostis
humani generis in the truest sense. Since no state has accepted
[Vol. 36
173. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 70 (Mr. Moore, dissenting).
174. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
175. Id. at 890.
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responsibility for their acts, there is no state against which
claims for redress can be made.'
1 76
After World War II, international law's concentration on human
rights placed crimes extremely harmful to human rights norms within
the universal jurisdiction category.' 77 As the United States D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals explained,
[u] nder the universal principle, states may prescribe and pros-
ecute "certain offenses recognized by the community of nations
as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism," even absent any special connection between
the state and the offense.
1 78
Like the D.C. Circuit, which recognized the application of universal
jurisdiction to a terrorist who had hijacked and destroyed an airliner in
the Middle East, 179 states have used this principle to pursue grave
176. Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achile Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 289 (1988). Halberstam outlines the
jurisdictional rationale as follows:
In the past, pirates used one ship to attack another and the motive was material gain.
Today, terrorists such as the hijackers of the Achille Lauro seize a ship, threaten its
passengers and kill them without regard to the flag it flies or the nationality of the
victims. That they do so by boarding the ship disguised as crew or passengers, rather
than by attacking it from another ship, or that they are motivated by hate, revenge or a
desire to call attention to a political cause rather than by a desire for material gain, does
not affect the two essential elements that have justified assertion of universal jurisdic-
tion in the past: that they are a threat to all states, and that no state can be held
responsible for their acts.
Id.
177. Jurisdiction over these offenses
directly concerns each state since fundamental human rights have now been conse-
crated by international law as an imperious postulate of the general community of
humankind. By acting in compliance with this postulate, each state protects the
interests of this entire community at the same time as it safeguards its own interests.
Louis Reni Beres, Genocide and Genocide-Like Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: CRiMus 275
(M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1986).
178. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
179. Id.
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violators of international law in their courts. Noteworthy examples
include Israel's prosecution of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann for
genocide and the persecution of minorities; 80 Spanish, l81 Belgian,
8 2
and French18 3 courts' charges against former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet; and obviously the Belgium arrest warrant for Ndombasi for
crimes against humanity, including genocide. 8 4 The Eichmann case is
particularly remarkable because Adolf Eichmann's crimes were commit-
ted before Israel became a state. Although Israel nominally indicted
Eichmann under Israeli law, in fact any strict application of that law to
Eichmann would have been blatantly ex post facto. The Eichmann trial
is justifiable, however, in that the Israeli law tracks the underlying
customary international law which was in existence prior to the time
that Eichmann committed his crimes. Indeed, acknowledging this
justification, the Eichmann court referenced the universal jurisdictional
base in its opinion.185 Thus in substance, although not in terms of
180. Att'y Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 299, 304 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
181. Union Progresista de Fiscales de Espana et al. v. Pinochet, Audiencia Nacional, Nov. 5, 1998
(Spain), at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/audi.html (confirming that the Span-
ish court has jurisdiction over the genocide and terrorism committed during the Chilean
dictatorship); Union Progresista de Fiscales de Espana et al. v. Pinochet, Audiencia Nacional, Nov. 3,
1998 (Spain), at http://www.derechos.net/doc/auto31198/ (ordering the extradition of Pi-
nochet); Union Progresista de Fiscales de Espana et al. v. Pinochet, Audiencia Nacional, Oct. 18, 1998
(Spain), at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/uicio/funda.html (Judgment amplifying the
Oct. 16, 1998, judgment by the Spanish National Criminal Court decreeing a provisional prison
sentence upon Pinochet and ordering his detention); see also THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF
AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAN 95 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 1986).
182. Aguilar Diaz et al. v. Pinochet, Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels (examining
magistrate), Order of 6 Nov. 1998, reprinted in 118JoURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 308 (1999), summarized
inREYDAMs, supra note 3, at 112.
183. See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 146-47
(2001).
184. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14).
185. The court explained:
The abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are not crimes under Israel [sic] law alone.
These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of
nations, are grave offences against the law of nations itself (delicta juris gentium).
Therefore, so far from international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of
countries with respect to such crimes, international law is, in the absence of an
International Court, in need of the judicial and legislative organs of every country to
give effect to its criminal interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial. The
jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is universal.
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procedural technicality, the Eichmann trial was important in reaffirm-
ing the universality of the crimes of genocide and persecution.
Because universal jurisdiction in general, and universal jurisdiction
in absentia assertions in particular, tend to threaten the sovereignty of
territorial, national, and harboring states, only those crimes that are
both most clearly defined and least subject to exaggeration and manipu-
lation under international law should qualify as universal. This is, in
effect, a very pragmatic argument: the more susceptible a category of
crime is to exaggeration and manipulation by prosecuting courts, the
more opportunity there is for baseless prosecutions motivated purely
by political or sensationalist incentives and, consequently, the less
sovereign states will pursue these types of prosecutions in practice. This
non-practice by states will result not only because the prosecutions will
be viewed as illegitimate from the outset by those states whose nationals
are involved, but also because of the threat that these types of assertions
will revisit a state wishing to assertjurisdiction any time it involves itself
in an endeavor which could potentially lead to universal crimes-say,
for example, a "war on terror" involving military initiatives around the
globe.
There are certain crimes falling under the rubric of universaljurisdic-
tion- genocide, torture, and slavery-whose definitions under interna-
tional law, along with their increased prosecution conducted pursuant
to the universality principle, create an objectivity that protects against
abuse. There are other crimes-war crimes and crimes against human-
ity-that, while they may qualify as universal offenses, also suffer from
problems of definition and scope. State governments' anxiety over
expansive definitions of these crimes would result in absolute opposi-
tion to any use of universal jurisdiction for fear that any time that state
is involved in military action, its soldiers-and even its leaders, through
doctrines of command responsibility-will end up the subject of some
foreign jurisdiction. And the malleable definitions of these crimes are
more susceptible to tampering and abuse by states that would bring
unfounded charges for purely political ends. Terrorism presents an
interesting problem in that as a category of crime it is impossible to
define and is otherwise susceptible to the same abuses that plague war
crimes and especially crimes against humanity. This Part avoids these
definitional problems by arguing that certain acts of terrorism, clearly
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 26 (Isr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem 1961), affJd, 36
I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962) (emphasis in original).
2005]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
defined in international and municipal law, are subject to universal
jurisdiction. The following Part examines the possible crimes that the
consensus of nations includes under the modern universal jurisdiction
rubric: genocide, slavery, torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and terrorism.
A. Genocide
Perhaps the most palpable crime of universal jurisdiction in interna-
tional law given the history of the past century is genocide. Genocide
may be roughly defined as committing certain acts against a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group with the intent to destroy that group.1 8 6
A variety of acts directed against the target group constitute genocide,
including killing, causing serious mental or bodily harm, deliberately
inflicting living conditions calculated to bring about the group's destruc-
tion, preventing births within the group, and transferring children of
the group to another group.18 7 Although the jurisdictional provision of
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide does not provide for extraterritorialjurisdiction by states,'88
it is now relatively well established that genocide is a crime of universal
jurisdiction. 1 89
186. Article 6 of the International Criminal Court describes:
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,July 17, 1998, art. 6, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004 [hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
statute/romefra.htm.
187. Id,
188. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
Hein's No. KAV 2303, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force onJan. 12., 1951, for the United States
Feb. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
189. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the
Indictment, Case No. ICTR-90-40-T (Trial Chamber I, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Mar. 18,
1999), 38 I.L.M. 866, 869 (1999).
[Vol. 36
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN ABSENTIA
B. Slavery
A less modern, but still unfortunately relevant, example of a univer-
sal jurisdiction crime is slavery. The universal nature of slavery is
historically closely associated with the universal nature of piracy, as
both offenses traditionally involved use of the high seas.1 90 Slavery is
categorized as a crime against humanity by the International Criminal
Court (ICC).'9 According to the ICC Statute, enslavement "means the
exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership
over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children."
192
C. Torture
Torture, like slavery, is one of the most accepted universal crimes.
193
The Torture Convention provides a universal jurisdictional base that
obliges states to prosecute or extradite torturers found within that
state's jurisdiction 19 4 and implicitly relies upon the principle of univer-
sality.195 Generally, torture is the intentional infliction of mental or
physical pain or suffering on a person by authorities when the person is
190. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 49.
191. SeeICC Statute, supra note 186, art. 7(2) (c).
192. Id.
193. SeeKenneth Roth, The Case for UniversalJurisdiction, 80 FoREIGN AF. 150, 151 (2001).
194. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, openedfor signature Feb. 4, 1984, S. TRATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(entered into forceJune 26, 1987). Article 5 of the Torture Convention states:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction
or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it
appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any
territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to
any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance
with internal law.
195. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 55-56.
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in their custody or control.1 9 6 Torture does not, however, include pain
or suffering that arises solely from "lawful" sanctions-which invariably
means sanctions that do not constitute torture under international
law. 197
D. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
So far this Part has discussed certain specific crimes of universal
jurisdiction that are accepted as such by the consensus of nations:
genocide, slavery, and torture. These crimes have in common a well-
defined and limited scope derived from international custom as evi-
denced by treaties and municipal legislation. Thus, the "universality" of
these specific crimes is dependent not only upon their substance but
also upon their definition and scope.
The same is not true of the definitions of "crimes against humanity"
and "war crimes" under current international law. At this time an
international consensus has not been reached as to some important
dimensions of these crimes. For this reason, universal jurisdictional
assertions based on war crimes and crimes against humanity not only
prove difficult for courts wishing to prosecute on these grounds, any
such assertions also ensure enough opposition by states that universal
jurisdiction might never take hold as to these crimes in the real world
of international law enforcement, and thus the attempted use of
universal jurisdiction over the crimes might even undermine the
legitimacy of the principle itself.
Crimes against humanity present a problem similar to terrorism. 98
Article 7 of the ICC Statute broadly defines crimes against humanity as
acts "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."' 99 While
there are certainly clearly defined crimes against humanity that are
subject to universal jurisdiction-i.e., genocide, slavery-the defini-
tional problem of potentially expanding this class of international
crime to encompass subjectively-determined conduct is great. Indeed,
an exhaustive list of crimes against humanity proves unmanageably
196. The ICC Statute defines torture as "the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused;
except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to, lawful sanctions." See ICC Statute, supra note 186, art. 7(2) (e).
197. Id.
198. See infra Part III.E.
199. ICC Statute, supra note 186, art. 7.
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expansive and vague, 200 and unlike our other crimes of universal
jurisdiction, "there is no specialized convention for crimes against
humanity. '20 ' For this reason, the safer route for international law
would be to stick to detailed definitions of individual offenses as
codified by international instruments for universal jurisdiction pur-
poses. Moreover, as Bassiouni points out, positive international law
dealing with crimes against humanity bases jurisdiction almost exclu-
sively on the principle of territoriality, and, "[a]s a result, one cannot
say that there is conventional law providing for universal jurisdiction
for 'crimes against humanity.'
20 2
Next, while war crimes and the humanitarian law governing such
crimes may be elaborately defined in international positive law through,
for example, the four Geneva Conventions20 3 and their two additional
protocols, 20 4 serious questions exist as to the scope of these crimes. It is
perhaps for this reason that state practice fails to demonstrate the use
of universal jurisdiction with respect to war crimes, and why, as Bas-
siouni points out, "[t] he recognition of universal jurisdiction for war
crimes is essentially driven by academics and experts' writings."
20 5
To be sure, there are clear core instances of war crimes. The napalm
bombardment of the Tokyo suburbs in May 1945, under the orders of
General Curtis LeMay, was as clear a war crime as one could possibly
imagine: his targets were women, children, and the elderly huddled in
wooden houses in the most densely populated area of the world, and
his avowed purpose was to terrorize the people of Japan so that they
would surrender and beg for mercy.206 But even though there are core
200. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 264
(2000).
201. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 52.
202. Id.
203. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
204. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol II].
205. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 51.
206. See Horro EDION, THE NIGHT ToKvo BURNED 17-18, 100-02 (1987).
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cases, the problem remains that war crimes at the current juncture of
world politics encompass too many peripheral cases. Further, no small
part of the humanitarian law governing armed conflict is aspirational.
As Theodor Meron points out, the "'excessive' humanization [of these
rules] might exceed the limits acceptable to armed forces, provoke
their resistance, and thus erode the credibility of the rules. ' 20 7 Indeed,
Meron explains that "[a]lthough the prospects for compliance with
humanitarian norms may be less auspicious than for other norms of
public international law, they enjoy stronger moral support."208 As a
result, we are "often prepared to accept a rather large gap between
practice and the norms concerned" such that "gradual and partial
compliance has been accepted as fulfilling the requirements for the
formation of customary law, and contrary practice downplayed." 20 9 The
reality of war may very well preclude absolute compliance with certain
rules of humanitarian law no matter how fervently a military endeavors
not to commit war crimes.
For example, the Office of the Independent Prosecutor for the ICTY
opted not to pursue even an investigation into the 1999 NATO bomb-
ing campaign in the former Yugoslavia despite evidence pointing to
NATO war crimes under a fastidious application of the ICTY Statute
and international humanitarian law generally.210 Under standards of
target selection and proportionality contained in articles 48, 51, and 85
of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions2  and reflected in the
207. Meron, supra note 200, at 241.
208. Id. at 244.
209. Id.
210. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Note, Manipulating International Criminal Procedure: The
Decision of the ICTY Office of the Independent Prosecutor Not To Investigate NATO Bombing in the Former
Yugoslavia, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (2003).
211. Protocol I, supra note 204. The standards for target selection encompassed in Protocol I
are as follows: 1) "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Id. art. 48; 2) "The civilian
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack." Id. art. 51 (2); 3)
"[Mlilitary objectives are.., those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." Id. art
52(2); 4) Attacks violate the target selection standards if they are "of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." Id. art. 51(4)(c); and 5) An
indiscriminate attack is defined as an "attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives
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Tribunal's statute, 12 NATO was effectively absolved of all responsibility
for approximately 500 civilian deaths resulting from the following: a
mid-morning attack on a bridge in which the NATO pilot blew up a
located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or
civilian objects." Id. art. 51(5) (a)
The standards for proportionality encompassed in Protocol I are as follows: First, article 57
provides that "[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects." Id. art. 57. With respect to attacks, article 57
requires that the following precautions be taken:
(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special
protection but are military objectives ....
(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(b) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective
is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(c) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit.
Id.
212. The ICTY recently explained:
Attacks which are not directed against military objectives (particularly attacks directed
against the civilian population) and attacks which cause disproportionate civilian
casualties or civilian property damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence of
unlawful attack under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute .... In determining whether or not
the mens rea requirement has been met, it should be borne in mind that commanders
deciding on an attack have duties:
(a) to do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military
objectives
(b) to take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and means of warfare
with a view to avoiding or, in any event to minimizing incidental civilian casualties
or civilian property damage, and to refrain from launching attacks which may be
expected to cause disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (June 8, 2000), 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1271 (2000),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm.
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civilian passenger train;213 the bombing by NATO pilots of a civilian
refugee column; 214 the bombing by NATO pilots of the Serbian
television and radio station;215 the bombing by NATO pilots of the
Chinese embassy;216 and the bombing by NATO pilots of the Yugoslav
village of Korisa.217 Despite easily made allegations of war crimes, it is
undisputed that the NATO bombing campaign was more calculated
and more obedient of international humanitarian law than any previ-
ous military action.21 8 What would be the result of a state hostile to
NATO initiating proceedings against Supreme Allied Commander,
General Wesley Clark, under a theory of universaljurisdiction? Such an
assertion would depend upon a standard of unprecedented and per-
haps unrealistic compliance with humanitarian law, would likely be
viewed as a farce, and yet might serve to chill any military initiative in
the future where the halting of a potential genocide-and the saving of
many lives-is at stake.
Even confining the discussion to the war in Iraq in the spring of
2003, again an example in which more effort was made to comply with
humanitarian law than ever before, there are many problematic situa-
tions. In terms of compliance, for the first time in military history
lawyers were embedded in infantry divisions to review proposed
strikes. 21 9 The lawyers gave on-the-spot advice on whether a strike was
legal under international humanitarian law. 220 From all accounts this
advice was strictly followed; indeed, the lead lawyer, Colonel Case,
reported that his advice was never overruled and sometimes command-
ers even rejected targets he said were legal.22' In contrast, Iraqi Ba'thist
and fedayeen soldiers were directed to shield themselves with the
bodies of women and children and to use civilian neighborhoods as
bases of operation-directions that were followed in combat.2 2 2 Among
other battle techniques, Iraqi forces lined up civilians in front of their
213. See Colangelo, supra note 210, at 1401-05.
214. Id. at 1405-10.
215. Id. at 1411-17.
216. Id. at 1417-19.
217. Id. at 1419-24.
218. See id. at 1426-27 and accompanying footnotes.
219. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 94 (2003), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203.pdf.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 67-68. These orders were employed in the field. An Iraqi taxi driver and eyewitness
reported that "[m]ost of the fedayeen and Ba'thists distributed and hid between houses because
they thought the Americans wouldn't shoot civilians. They used civilians as shields." Id. at 67.
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vehicles in order to advance safely, herded women and children out of
their homes in order to fire rocket propelled grenades over their
heads, and picked up children to use as shields during firefights in
order to cross roads safely.223 Did the U.S. helicopter pilots flying
overhead and soldiers traveling through the streets commit war crimes
when they returned fire upon Iraqi snipers and militia members
positioned next to or behind civilians?224 Inevitably some civilians were
killed, but were these acts indictable war crimes?
Additionally, in the 2003 Iraq conflict, 67% of the bombs dropped by
U.S. and U.K. forces were precision-guided weapons designed to
protect against civilian casualties,225 in contrast to 8% in the 1991
Persian Gulf conflict, 33% percent in the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, and 65% percent in the conflict in Afghanistan.226 U.S. and
U.K- forces also took other measures to prevent against civilian loss of
life: they bombed at night, used penetrator munitions and delayed
fuses to reduce fragmentation, and used attack angles that accounted
for the locations of civilian facilities.227 Nonetheless, was the accurate
targeting of a home in a Baghdad suburb by precision-guided bombs a
war crime if civilians died in the attack where the United States acted
on "time-sensitive" intelligence that Saddam Hussein and his sons were
physically present in the residence?228 Finally, did the United States'
use of cluster bombs violate the standard of target discrimination
despite a multi-level screening system of computer and human vet-
ting?
2 2 9
Compounding these problems are the second-order issues of com-
mand responsibility. Are the American leaders of the war in Iraq,
including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, President George W.
Bush, and General Tommy Franks, vicariously liable as war criminals
for the previously described actions and non-actions of the American
soldiers and pilots?
23 0
223. Id. at 67-68.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 16.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 17.
228. Id. at 22-25.
229. Id. at 92-98.
230. For one concrete example, Human Rights Watch explains that
U.S. air forces carry out a collateral damage [civilian death] estimate using a computer
model designed to determine the weapon, fuze, attack angle, and time of day that will
ensure maximum effect on a target with minimum civilian casualties. Defense Secretary
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In Kosovo and Iraq, the United States adhered more strictly to
international humanitarian law and used more advanced military
technology than the world has ever seen to protect against loss of
civilian life. Yet it is totally conceivable that some country would, and
could, assert universal jurisdiction based upon a variety of alleged war
crimes. The "public relations" benefit of "standing up to the super-
power" might serve as a propagandistic, rather than a legalistic, reason
for going ahead. And yet the outcome would be self-destructive. The
usefulness of universal jurisdiction under the right circumstances
would be undermined by stretching the category to include wrongful
or doubtful circumstances. The idea of accountability for universal
crimes would be rendered vacuous if it could be so easily manipulated
for sensationalist or propagandistic purposes.
Of course, the country that most objects to universal jurisdiction for
war crimes is the United States.23 1 Why should the world's only super-
power be exempt from individual accountability? Isn't the United
States big enough and powerful enough to withstand occasional as-
saults upon its dignity as might result from a marginal assertion of
jurisdiction over one of its leaders for war crimes? These charges might
have merit if the United States in fact did not take war-crimes prosecu-
tions seriously. 232 But in fact the political leaders of the United States
are just as risk-averse to the possibility of being held individually
accountable for war crimes as the leaders of any other country.2 33 It is
this very fact of fear of being subject to international criminal jurisdic-
Donald Rumsfeld reportedly had to authorize personally all targets that had a collateral
damage estimate of more than thirty civilian casualties.
Id. at 19.
231. For example, not only has the United States expressed its desire not to be party to the
International Criminal Court and therefore subject its soldiers to ICC jurisdiction, the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act 2002, H.R. 4775, 107th Cong. (2002) authorizes the President to
use "all means necessary and appropriate"-i.e., including military action-to bring about the
release of American soldiers in ICC custody.
232. See, e.g., Edward Wong, Top Commanders Face Questioning on Prison Abuse, N.Y. TimEsJune
22, 2004, at Al; Eric Schmitt, U.S. Army Charges 4 Soldiers in the Drowning Death of an Iraqi Man, N.Y.
TIMES,July 3, 2004, at A7 (also summarizing other charges filed against U.S. soldiers in Iraq).
233. Even though, to take our previous example, jurisdiction in absentia by a foreign court
against President Bush for war crimes in Iraq would be to all intents and purposes unenforceable
and therefore of no practical effect against George W. Bush, it does not follow that he would not
be deeply upset by the commencement of such a proceeding against him. Indeed, the United
States put significant pressure on Belgium to repeal its expansive universal jurisdiction-type
legislation when cases were brought before the Belgian courts alleging war crimes by top U.S.
officials in both Gulf Wars. Belgium subsequently amended the law. See Steven R. Ratner, Editorial
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tion that makes the subject of the present Article significant at the
present time.234
The ostensible reason the United States objects to war crimes prosecu-
tions based on universal jurisdiction is roughly as follows: in the
foreseeable future when it falls to the United States to take military
action around the world for humanitarian, peacekeeping, or inclusive
world interest purposes, if any war crimes are committed in any war,
that war will involve American commanders and troops. This is true
with respect to UN, NATO, and multilateral "Coalition" interventions
in Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It is no secret that the near
future may envisage American military initiatives in Iran, Syria, and
North Korea. Thus an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of
recent and foreseeable international military engagements will involve
the active participation of the American military. Although political
leaders of other countries share the same theoretical risk of interna-
tional prosecution for war crimes as American leaders, in fact it is the
latter group that will inevitably be most exposed to these charges. This
risk-in-fact of individual accountability to American leaders far out-
weighs the risk-in-theory to leaders in all countries.
To be sure, the foregoing is not intended to convince the reader that
the United States is justified in all of its military actions (that is well
outside the scope of this argument). Rather, the purpose has been to
show that any armed conflict, no matter how carefully planned and
executed and no matter what the justification, will involve instances
that can be viewed as war crimes, and to show that involved states will
object to the use of universal jurisdiction as to war crimes for this
reason. At the present juncture in world history, and for the foresee-
able future, the United States will be the most involved state. For this
reason, the position of the United States with respect to universal
jurisdiction over war crimes may well remain diametrically opposed to
the stated interests of other nations in exercising jurisdiction and even
proceeding with prosecutions. Discretion may be the better part of
valor. In order to affirm the practice of universal jurisdiction, nations
might be well advised to limit universal jurisdictional assertions to
Comment: Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 888, 891 (2003) (describing
the amendment process due to pressure from other states, and in particular, the United States).
234. Prior to the Nuremberg trials, political and military leaders felt an immunity for any of
their actions against other countries. Nuremberg was a watershed development, not so much
legally (there had been previous war-crimes prosecutions) as psychologically: the lesson was
brought home to every military and political leader that certain policies cannot be set in motion
without committing an international crime.
2005]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
crimes of genocide, slavery, torture, and certain acts of terrorism.
Prosecutions for war crimes simply may be too controversial and
susceptible to abuse at present to make them subject to universal
jurisdiction in practice.
E. Certain Acts of Terrorism
Certain acts of terrorism are the most recent additions to the list of
consensus crimes of universal jurisdiction. Even before the terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center in New York in September 2001,
Bassiouni noted the large catalogue of international instruments deal-
ing with the problem of international terrorism:
The United Nations bodies and agencies have produced, be-
tween 1963-1999, fourteen international conventions, six draft
conventions, thirty-four resolutions, forty-six reports, seven stud-
ies by the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, five
Notes by the Secretary-General and eighteen miscellaneous
documents pertaining to "terrorism," totaling 112 instruments
and documents on the subject.235
However, a controversy arises with respect to terrorism from the
difficulty in arriving at a comprehensive and workable definition of the
crime236 ... though its definition is unfortunately becoming clearer
with each passing year. Terrorism is increasingly viewed by the interna-
tional legal community as an act of war or rebellion committed by
persons not self-identified as military agents against civilian non-
combatants. Yet, because of its lingering definitional uncertainty it is
still premature to flatly categorize "terrorism" as a universal crime.
237
Like crimes against humanity, because of the flexibility of the general
definition, the potential for baseless jurisdictional assertions rooted in
corrupt motives would, as a practical matter, rightly block the practice
of using "terrorism" as a crime of universal jurisdiction. 38
Nonetheless, this does not mean that there are not certain well-
defined acts of terrorism that are excluded from the universal crime
category. Numerous international conventions have spelled out con-
235. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes of Terror Violence, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES
765, 767 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
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cretely various forms of terrorism. 239 For example, if a hijacker keeps
people hostage and preconditions release on some forced act, he
would violate the international law reflected in the 1979 International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, also known as the Hostage
Convention.2 4 °
Perhaps the best way to present this argument is through examina-
tion of the recent United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling
in United States v. Yousef that terrorism is not a crime of universal
jurisdiction under customary international law. 2 4 ' The holding in
Yousef that "terrorism," and implicitly that a specific act of terrorism-
planting a bomb on a civilian aircraft-is not subject to universal
jurisdiction 242 is problematic for a number of reasons. Principally, the
opinion's discussion of international law is exceedingly incomplete.
239. The world community has adopted at least eight global antiterrorist conventions. They
include: the Convention on Offenses and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo
Convention), the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Conven-
tion), the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Montreal Convention), the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (Convention on Protected Per-
sons), the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention), the
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation (Airport Security Protocol), the IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime navigation (Maritime Terrorism Convention), and the Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental
Shelf (Fixed Platforms Protocol).John F. Murphy, The Future ofMultilateralism and Efforts to Combat
International Terrorism, 25 COLUM.J. TRANs. L. 35, 41-53 (1986).
240. Article I states that:
1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to
detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to
compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organi-
zation, a natural orjuridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from
doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage
commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning
of this Convention.
2. Any person who:
(a) attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or
(b) participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to commit
an act of hostage-taking
likewise commits an offence for the purposes of this Convention.
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into forceJune 3, 1983).
241. Yousef 327 F.3d at 107-08.
242. Id.
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The discussion extensively details principles for evaluating customary
international law243 and then proceeds to ignore these principles in
evaluating whether the act of planting a bomb on a civilian aircraft is
subject to universal jurisdiction. In fact, the opinion issues two holdings
that directly contradict one another under its international law analy-
sis. Specifically, the universal jurisdiction holding conflicts with the
effect of the opinion itself on the question of whether universal
jurisdiction over the act of planting a bomb on a civilian aircraft is
permissible as a matter of customary law.
The opinion holds that Yousef's actions, consisting of planting an
explosive on a civilian airliner, do not constitute a crime subject to
universal jurisdiction under customary international law.2 44 In so hold-
ing, it rejects the district court's reliance on the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States as misplaced because the
Restatement is merely the writing of publicists, which is not a valid source
of international law but may be used only as a clarifying resource.245 In
this respect the opinion is absolutely correct. What is incorrect is the
opinion's failure to consider the strong evidence of international
custom reflected in the treaty upon which the opinion relies,246 the
municipal legislation upon which the opinion relies,247 and the out-
come of the opinion itself, which holds Yousef subject to extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction absent a national or territorial U.S. link to the of-
fense.2 48 Yousef is not a U.S. national, the plane on which Yousef
planted the bomb was travelling between the Philippines and Japan,
and the bomb killed a Japanese national (and there was further no
evidence that a U.S. national was even aboard the flight).249
The opinion provides an in-depth discussion of the sources of
international law.25° It focuses primarily on article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court ofJustice, which is widely considered to be the
authoritative touchstone for evaluating the existence of international
law. Article 38, as reproduced in the text of the opinion, 25' reads in
243. See id. at 90-109.
244. Id. at 107-08.
245. Id. at 99-100.
246. Namely, the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
247. Namely, the Aircraft Sabotage Act, codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1994).
248. Yousef, 327 F.3d at97-98, 108-10.
249. Id. at 97.
250. Id. at 90-109.
251. Id. at 100-01.
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part:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.252
The second most important source of international law according to
this unofficial hierarchy-after treaties-is customary international
law.
In order to determine customary international law, the ICJ Statute
quoted above and U.S. Supreme Court precedent direct that courts
look to "settled rule[s] of international law" as recognized by "the
assent of civilized nations" and "the general usage and practice of
nations[,] or [to] judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law."253 As the opinion itself puts it, customary law is derived "primarily
from the official acts and practices of States,"25 4 and "the acts and
decisions of States are sources of law."255 The opinion even quotes in its
text the statement that "[t] he records or evidence of international law
are the documents or acts proving the consent of States to its rules.
Among such records or evidence, treaties and practice play an essential
part, though recourse must also be had to unilateral declarations,
instructions to diplomatic agents, laws and ordinances .... 256 Impor-
252. Statute of the International Court ofJustice,June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3
Bevans 1153, 1179.
253. See id.; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (concluding that the
law of nations may be ascertained "from judicial decisions, from the works of jurists and
commentators, and from the acts and usages of civilized nations").
254. Yousef 327 F.3d at 93.
255. Id. at 101.
256. Id. (quoting CLIVE PARRY, THE SouRcEs AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNAI1ONAL LAw 2 (1965)
(emphasis in original)).
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tantly, the opinion then goes on to hold that Yousef s actions render
him subject to U.S. jurisdiction under positive law pursuant to U.S.
obligations under the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.257 Not only that, but
the opinion holds that Yousef is independently subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion under the Montreal Convention's implementing municipal legisla-
tion, the Aircraft Sabotage Act, codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C.
§ 32(b). 258 All three of these sources of law-(1) the treaty, (2) the
municipal legislation, and (3) the Yousefopinion itself-supply power-
ful evidence of a customary international rule that subjects people who
plant bombs on civilian aircraft to universal jurisdiction.
A state's entrance into a treaty with other states and commitment to
be bound thereby constitutes the maximal expression of state sover-
eignty and "assent" to the particular rules contained in that treaty; the
state's implementing legislation pursuant to the treaty compounds this
assent by demonstrating a "general usage and practice" designed to
enforce those rules; and finally, "the [state's] judicial decisions recog-
niz[e] and enforc [e] that law" in practice.259
The Montreal Convention, which was put into effect in 1971, cur-
rently has 173 states parties, which means that in the last thirty years the
vast majority of states in the world have agreed to bind themselves to
and put into practice through domestic legislation andjudicial enforce-
ment the provisions of the treaty.260 As the opinion rightly points out,
the Montreal Convention "creates a basis for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion that is moored in a process of formal lawmaking and that is
binding only on the States that accede to it."'26 ' But it is precisely this
process of formal lawmaking between sovereign states, their mutual
assent to the rule agreed upon, and their affirmative adoption and
implementation of this rule in domestic legislation andjudicial decision-
making that constitutes evidence of the customary rule. What is impor-
tant to keep in mind is that the treaty, the municipal legislation, and
the judicial opinion are not themselves customary international law; rather
they make up the absolute best evidence of what a state, the United
States, and all other states party to the Montreal Convention consider
to be a legally binding practice-and in this respect supply the most
powerful evidence possible of customary international law there is.
257. Id. at 108-09; see also Montreal Convention, supra note 246.
258. Yousef 327 F.3d at 110.
259. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160-61.
260. See Montreal Convention, supra note 246, art. 7.
261. 327F.3d at 96.
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In short, the fact that Yousef is subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the
Montreal Convention-which has been ratified by the vast majority of
states in the world-and its implementing legislation provides perhaps
the ultimate example of a customary international rule that allows for
extraterritorial jurisdiction absent a national or territorial nexus to the
accused where the offense involves planting a bomb on a civilian
aircraft.
The existence of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction over
Yousef's crime becomes apparent upon examination of the Montreal
Convention and 18 U.S.C. § 32(b). These sources of law evidence (1) a
state practice of asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction absent traditional
territorial or national links (2) over a specifically defined offense:
planting a bomb on a civilian aircraft-not "terrorism."
First, as the opinion observes, "[t]he purpose of the Montreal
Convention is to ensure that individuals who attack airlines cannot take
refuge in a country because its courts lack jurisdiction over someone
who committed such an act against a foreign-flag airline in another
",262an"[hnation, and "[t] he express purpose of the [Montreal] Convention is
to ensure that terrorists who commit crimes on or against aircraft
cannot take refuge in countries whose courts otherwise might have
lacked jurisdiction over an offense against a foreign-flag aircraft that
transpired either in another State or in international airspace."2 6 3
Article 7 provides for a treaty-based equivalent of universaljurisdiction.
It states:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its compe-
tent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authori-
ties shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case
of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that
State.26 4
Indeed, as the opinion proclaims,
262. Id. at 90.
263. Id. at 96.
264. Montreal Convention, supra note 246, art. 7.
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the Convention does not condition the requirement that a
State party extradite or prosecute such an individual found
within the State on the existence of any additional contacts
between that State and either the offender or the offense. In
other words, no nexus requirement delimits the obligation of
parties to the Convention to prosecute offenders.265
Moreover, the implementing legislation enacted pursuant to article
5(2)266 and codified at section 32(b) of the Aircraft Sabotage Act
provides for jurisdiction over offenses like Yousef's "if a national of the
United States was on board, or would have been on board, the aircraft;
an offender is a national of the United States; or an offender is afterwards
found in the United States."267 These provisions are clearly indicative of a
universal jurisdictional base for this offense.
A useful comparative example to highlight the expansive nature of
the jurisdictional provisions of the Montreal Convention and its imple-
menting legislation is the universal crime of genocide. "Genocide" had
not been defined as a crime, let alone a universal crime, at the time the
International Military Tribunal prosecuted the Nazis. 268 The universal
nature of the crime arose out of a treaty-the 1948 Convention on the
265. 327 F.3d at 109.
266. Article 5(2) reads:
Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 (a), (b)
and (c), and in Article 1, paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph relates to those
offences, in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this
Article.
Montreal Convention, supra note 246, art. 7.
267. 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
268. Genocide was prosecuted as a crime against humanity. Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter defines crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts commit-
ted against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288.
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Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.269 Through the
process discussed above, the mutual assent and commitment by sover-
eign states to follow a certain practice with respect to the crime of
genocide rendered it a universal offense as a matter of customary law.
Expressly rejected, however, in the drafting of the Genocide Conven-
tion was the draft jurisdictional provision providing for extraterritorial
jurisdiction, which read: "[Persons charged with genocide] may also be
tried by tribunals other than those of the States in the territories of
which the act was committed, if they have been arrested by the
authorities of such States, and provided no request has been made for
extradition. ' 270 The jurisdictional provision eventually adopted by the
Genocide Convention provided that the offender "shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed. "27
By contrast, the jurisdictional provisions in the Montreal Convention
not only authorize but expressly mandate extraterritorial jurisdiction
absent traditional links-the equivalent of universal jurisdiction in
customary law. Thus, it is not simply the fact that all of these states
agreed to prosecute the planting of bombs on aircraft that creates
universal jurisdiction over the offense (as is the rationale for genocide
as a universal crime), but the Montreal Convention actually provides
for this type of exceptional jurisdiction so that perpetrators of this
crime do not escapejustice.
Yousef holds that "terrorism" is not a crime of universal jurisdiction
because there is no internationally agreed-upon definition of the
crime.2 72 This may be so, but it is wrong to categorize Yousefs crime
exclusively as "terrorism" under international law, and there is no
reason to deny its universal nature on this ground when an internation-
ally agreed-upon definition of the crime is readily apparent.
Just as the jurisdictional provisions of the Montreal Convention and
its implementing legislation define the type ofjurisdictional assertions
that are permissible under customary law for prosecuting people who
plant bombs on civilian airplanes, the definitional provisions of the
treaty and municipal law define the offense itself. Article 1 of the
Montreal Convention defines the prohibited conduct as follows:
269. SeeGenocide Convention, supra note 188.
270. William A. Schabas, Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Heregovina? First Judgments of
the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 25 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 23, 23 n.3 (2001)
(citing UN Doc A/C.6/218).
271. Genocide Convention, supra note 188, art. 6.
272. Yousef 327 F.3d at 106-08.
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Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intention-
ally:
places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to
destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it
incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to
endanger its safety in flight.
273
Section 32(b) defines the offense similarly.274 These definitions need
not invoke the exclusive label "terrorism." Planting an explosive on a
civilian aircraft is simply a crime that customary international law
considers subject to universal jurisdiction irrespective of whether it is a
"terrorist" act or not. If the terrorist were instead a common soldier
who planted a bomb on a civilian plane, that act would absolutely
qualify as a war crime and could therefore be subject to universal
jurisdiction.275 Why should the result be any different for a terrorist
where the crime is much more clearly articulated than under the
proportionality and target discrimination standards governing war
crimes? 2 7 6 Indeed, this type of act-bomb planting on commercial
airliners-is exactly the sort of crime for which the universal jurisdic-
tion category was invented. As Yousef mentions, piracy was the original
crime of universaljurisdiction.277 And as discussed,278 universaljurisdic-
tion developed to deal with piracy because, like airline bombing and
other terrorist acts, it attacks states indiscriminately and disrupts inter-
national stability on multiple levels, damaging the economic, diplo-
matic, and security foundations of the world community of states.
273. Montreal Convention, supra note 246, art. 1.
274. It defines the offender as someone who willfully
places or causes to be placed on a civil aircraft registered in a country other than the
United States while such aircraft is in service, a device or substance which is likely to
destroy the aircraft, or to cause damage to that aircraft which renders that aircraft
incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger that aircraft's safety in flight.
18 U.S.C. § 32(b).
275. See Yousef 327 F.3d at 105 (explaining that the United States recognizes "war crimes...
as crimes for which international law permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction") (citing
Demjanuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985)).
276. See supra notes 211-12.
277. Yousef 327 F.3d at 104.
278. Seediscussion supra Part III.
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Because the crimes of genocide, slavery, torture, and certain acts of
terrorism are both universally condemned and may engender criminal
jurisdiction absent national or territorial links, they qualify as crimes of
universal jurisdiction. Moreover, unlike the general categories of "war
crimes" and "crimes against humanity," their restrictive scope makes
them good candidates for in absentia assertions by curtailing the
potential for abuse and exaggeration of their definitions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has dealt with the two main issues facing the modern
doctrine and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction: (i)
whether universal jurisdiction can be exercised in absentia, and (ii)
what crimes qualify as crimes of universal jurisdiction. As the argument
has shown, these issues effect both a theoretical and practical clash
between international justice on the one hand and peaceful interna-
tional relations based on respect for state sovereignty on the other.
Taking these competing interests into account, the Article has argued
in favor of a modern principle of universaljurisdiction that allows for in
absentia assertions in a way that is respectful of sovereignty while
empowering international justice to deal with universal crimes. It has
further argued in favor of universal jurisdiction over only the most
clearly articulated universal offenses under international law to prevent
against abuse of the principle and to foster development of the
customary rule. In an increasingly shrinking world focused on combat-
ing universal crimes like terrorist bombings and crippling tyrannical
regimes that perpetrate grave human rights violations, a modern
principle of universal jurisdiction that allows for in absentia assertions
and signaling among states, but limits its ambit to the most definite
international offenses, provides an innovative and peaceful interna-
tional law enforcement mechanism.
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